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Abstract
Probabilistic Modeling and Inference for Obfuscated Network Attack
Sequences
Haitao Du
Supervising Professor: Dr. Shanchieh Jay Yang
Prevalent computing devices with networking capabilities have become critical network
infrastructure for government, industry, academia and every-day life. As their value rises,
the motivation driving network attacks on this infrastructure has shifted from the pursuit
of notoriety to the pursuit of profit or political gains, leading to network attack on various
scales. Facing diverse network attack strategies and overwhelming alters, much work has
been devoted to correlate observed malicious events to pre-defined scenarios, attempting to
deduce the attack plans based on expert models of how network attacks may transpire.
We started the exploration of characterizing network attacks by investigating how tem-
poral and spatial features of attack sequence can be used to describe different types of
attack sources in real data set. Attack sequence models were built from real data set to
describe different attack strategies. Based on the probabilistic attack sequence model, at-
tack predictions were made to actively predict next possible actions. Experiments through
attack predictions have revealed that sophisticated attackers can employ a number of ob-
fuscation techniques to confuse the alert correlation engine or classifier. Unfortunately,
most exiting work treats attack obfuscations by developing ad-hoc fixes to specific obfus-
cation technique. To this end, we developed an attack modeling framework that enables a
vi
systematical analysis of obfuscations.
The proposed framework represents network attack strategies as general finite order
Markov models and integrates it with different attack obfuscation models to form proba-
bilistic graphical model models. A set of algorithms is developed to inference the network
attack strategies given the models and the observed sequences, which are likely to be ob-
fuscated. The algorithms enable an efficient analysis of the impact of different obfuscation
techniques and attack strategies, by determining the expected classification accuracy of the
obfuscated sequences. The algorithms are developed by integrating the recursion concept
in dynamic programming and the Monte-Carlo method.
The primary contributions of this work include the development of the formal frame-
work and the algorithms to evaluate the impact of attack obfuscations. Several knowledge-
driven attack obfuscation models are developed and analyzed to demonstrate the impact of
different types of commonly used obfuscation techniques. The framework and algorithms
developed in this work can also be applied to other contexts beyond network security. Any
behavior sequences that might suffer from noise and require matching to pre-defined mod-
els can use this work to recover the most likely original sequence or evaluate quantitatively
the expected classification accuracy one can achieve to separate the sequences.
vii
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1.1 Overwhelming, diverse and evolving network attacks
Prevalent computing devices with networking capabilities have become critical network
infrastructure for government, industry, academia and every-day life. As their value rises,
the motivation driving network attacks on this infrastructure has shifted from the pursuit
of notoriety to the pursuit of profit [1, 2] or political gains, leading to network attack on
various scales.
As new software vulnerabilities are discovered by few elite attackers, they are routinely
bought and sold by underground organizations. Corresponding attack tools take advantage
of the novel vulnerabilities and recruit new zombie (compromised) hosts for the attacker.
As shown in Fig. 1.1, Fuchsberger [3] published ten years ago, gives the trends of network
attack, i.e., attack sophistication will increasing over time, at the same time only limited
intruder’s knowledge are needed. All of these trends are coming from the automated attack
tools and compromised zombie hosts.
According to the Symantec Internet security threat report [1] [4], the largest botnet
observed in 2010 had over 1 million bots under control, and underground economy adver-
tisements promote 10,000 bots for $15. There are 552 million identities exposed during
year 2013, which is almost five times than identities exposed during 2012. Moreover, there
are more targeted attacks [4] with reasonable level of sophistication for specific sensitive
data, in addition of random attacks created by virus or worms for propagation. Large-scale
cyber attacks can take the traditional form of a botnet, from which a large number of hosts
2
Figure 1.1: Attack sophistication vs. Intruder technical knowledge
perform similar actions, e.g., Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) or distributed stealthy
scans [2]; they can also consist of a set of colluding sources dividing up tasks, interleav-
ing actions over time and dispersing over the IP and port spaces to conceal their overall
strategy.
1.2 Intrusion detection and alert correlation
Network attacks can be captured and observed by Intrusion Detection System (IDS) alerts.
The essential goal of a IDS is to differentiate malicious activities from the normal ones
and report suspicious actions to network analyst. For more than two decades, significant
effort has been put into advancing intrusion detection via anomaly-based and signature-
based systems [3]. Anomaly-based detection techniques model the users or systems normal
behavior, and report outliers as potential malicious activities. On the other hand, signature-
based detection systems usually maintain a database of malicious behavior signatures and
use pattern matching techniques to detect malicious actions. Anomaly-based detection
systems can be very effective to deal with novel attacks, but suffer from overwhelming false
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positives. Signatures-based system can have more accurate detection but can be ineffective
on novel attacks. Details of intrusion detection techniques can be found in several survey
papers, e.g., [5, 3, 6, 7].
Intrusion detection is challenging because of the variety of normal behaviors, fast
changing cyber environment (network services and configuration) as well as new vulnera-
bilities and attacks. While intrusion detection techniques continues to evolve and improve,
the overwhelming and heterogeneous IDS alerts has made the analysis difficult and unable
to provide an effective situation assessment. As a result, alert correlation has become a
popular topic in the past decade [8, 9]. Ideally, the goal of alert correlation is to determine
collections of IDS alerts, where each collection corresponds to a high-level description of
the attack.
The tasks of alert correlation can be categorized into Normalization (Norm.), Aggrega-
tion (Agg.), Correlation (Corr.) and Strategy Analysis (SA) [9]. The normalization orga-
nizes the format of alerts from heterogeneous IDS sensors. Aggregation combines alerts
that share the same root causes, e.g., originated from same source IP or attack the same
target. In the correlation step, aggregated alerts are mapped into an attack scenario tem-
plate. Further, the causal relationship, i.e., pre-condition and post-condition, can be used in
strategy analysis to infer attack intention and strategies.
The details of alert correlation and a performance evaluation1 can be found in [9, 10].
Table 1.1 uses an example to illustrate an ordered sequence of seven alerts for alert corre-
lation. The example is extracted from [11] which provides a comprehensive framework for
alert correlation.
The monitored network has four heterogeneous IDS sensors, i.e., network based IDS 1
and 2, (N1,N2), host based and application based IDS (H, A). The attacker (31.3.3.7) first
launches a port scan against 10.0.0.1 and discovers the vulnerability of Apache server. After
1Performance evaluation is very challenging for alert correlation. To best of our knowledge, Haines’s work
[10] is the only one systematically evaluates and compares the performance for different alert correlation
system. In the end of Chapter 2, we will discuss the technical gap of performance evaluation for existing
attack analysis systems.
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Table 1.1: An example of alert correlation scenario
Alert ID Description Sensor Start/End Time Source Target
1 IIS Exploit N1 12.0/12.0 80.0.0.1 10.0.0.1, port: 80
2 Scanning N2 10.1/14.8 31.3.3.7 10.0.0.1
3 Port Scan N1 10.0/15.0 31.3.3.7 10.0.0.1
4 Apache Exploit N1 22.0/22.0 31.3.3.7 10.0.0.1, port: 80
5 Bad Request A 22.0/22.1 localhost, Apache
6 Local Exploit H 24.6/24.6 linuxconf
7 Local Exploit H 24.7/24.7 linuxconf
scanning, the attacker performs a successful Apache buffer overflow exploit on the target
and obtains user privilege on the server. Finally, the attacker launches privilege escalation
by using a local exploit linuxconf. In addition, there is one noisy alert triggered by a
worm that probes the same target while the attack is in progress. The ideal output of alert
correlation would successfully group Alerts #2 and #3 as malicious scanning, Alerts #4 and
#5 as vulnerability attempts, Alerts #6 and #7 as privilege escalation, and the noisy Alert
#1 will be marked as irrelevant. After the aggregation of alerts, the scanning, vulnerability
attempts and privilege escalation should be correlated and reported to security analysts.
This example shows that once correlated, an analyst can be more effective to process the
high-level attack descriptions instead of individual alerts.
The methodologies widely used in correlation engines include similarity-based cluster-
ing and causal relationship based (pre/post condition) reasoning [9]. The attack scenario
templates can be pre-defined or automatically learned from data. Uncertainties usually are
captured with Bayesian networks, which will be reviewed in Section 1.4. Table 1.2 is a
summary of representative alert correlation approaches.
Alert correlation synthesizes the raw IDS alerts into attack scenarios and provides better
situation awareness to security analysts. However, as discussed earlier, the ever-changing
environment, e.g., software patches, new IDSs, customized alerts, and new exploits, make
alert correlation challenging. In addition, the attack-scenario (pre/post-condition) based
5
Table 1.2: Review of alert correlation work
Ref. Framework Methodology
[12] Agg. Similarity-based clustering
[13] Corr., SA Pre/post condition based correlation
[14] Norm., Agg., Corr. Exam source-target relationship
[15] Agg., Corr. Pre/post condition based correlation
[16] Corr. Similarity based, Pre/post condition based correlation
[17] Agg., Corr. Bayesian networks based inference
[18] Corr. Bayesian networks, Pre/post condition based correlation
[19] Corr. Bayesian networks based inference
[20] Agg., Corr. Similarity-based clustering
[11] Agg., Corr. Complete system, attack scenario based correlation
[21] Corr. Data mining for frequent structured patterns
approaches are accurate but will not scale for a large number of diverse and unknown
attacks, similar to the limitation of signature-based intrusion detection.
1.3 Host clustering and botnet detection
Going beyond focusing on examining the detailed attack action level and alert correlation,
in a large scale, host clustering work allows us to group a large number of (normal or ma-
licious) hosts that share similar behavior into clusters. Host clustering and botnet detection
are other useful tools for network analyst to understand large scale attacks.
The input for host clustering usually is passive Internet backbone traffic [22, 23, 24, 25]
or malicious traffic [26, 27] and the outputs are host clusters with behavior pattern descrip-
tions, which could be useful for anomaly detection and attack profiling. Some malicious
activities, such as worms, scanning and DDoS attacks, can be detected behavior by host
clustering work [24, 25]. An example of host clustering for botnet detection can be found
in [25]. Scan activity, spam activity, binary downloading and exploit activity are classical
activities that botnet hosts would behave. By looking at the host clusters that exhibit these
different activities, one can infer the structure of botnet zombie hosts.
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The key differences between various types of host clustering work can be understood
as selecting different features to form a multi-dimensional data point and objective function
for clustering them. The data point x represents an attacking host that contains several fea-
tures on security context. Among all the basic attributes in the communications, the widely
used features are statistics from flow information (source IP, destination IP) and protocol
information (TCP/IP protocol, source port, definition port). Figure 1.2 is an example of
data points from host clustering work [23] and [28]. For the left subfigure, every point
in the figure represents one attacking host. Three features, Relative Uncertainty (RU) on
source port, destination port, and destination IP are taken into account to characterize an
attacker’s behavior. For the right subfigure, every data points represents a set of attacking
sources sharing the same spatial attributes, e.g., number of targets, etc... The data points in
Fig. 1.2 exhibit cluster patterns,. After selecting the features, the next step is clustering the
data points, which optimizes on specific objective function. Different objective functions
group data points based on different principles. Some of them minimize the distance be-
tween data points and cluster center (e.g., K-means clustering) and some utilizing the graph
cut notion (e.g., spectral clustering) to separate points are distinct from each other. Table
1.3 is a summary review of host clustering work.
Figure 1.2: Examples of data points for host clustering
Host clustering analyzes a large number of attacking sources by grouping similar attack
sources and extracting patterns of clusters. It may be ineffective to discover sophisticated
7
Table 1.3: Review of host clustering work
Ref. Features Methodology
[25] Flows and packets statistics X-means clustering
[22] Flows and protocol statistics Hierarchical clustering
[23] Relative uncertainty on flows Customized algorithm
[24] Relative uncertainty on flows Spectral clustering
[26] Statistics on flows Hierarchical clustering
[27] Statistics on flows Customized algorithm
attacks, which take slow actions and utilize multiple attack sources. Nevertheless, the fea-
tures and the clustering analysis methodology can be very helpful for treating overwhelm-
ing numbers of alerts. Further, the overwhelming attacking data with various types of fea-
tures has led to challenges to extract, comprehend and predict the diverse attack strategies
and goals within the mixture of various attack strategies.
1.4 Network attack modeling and prediction
Network attack modeling is a widely used term, in early stage, most models are descriptive
and deterministic model. In late 1990’s, Cohen et al. [29] provided one of the pioneering
network attack modeling frameworks. They used cause-and-effect models to deduce 37
threat profiles (behaviors), 94 attacks (physical and cyber), and 140 defense mechanisms,
and reported a set of simulation results [30]. Their work, along with several others [31, 5,
32] in late 1990’s and early 2000’s, have provided a comprehensive understanding of the
different cyber attack types and their effect to networked systems.
Computational and probabilistic modeling is another important branch of attack mod-
eling. Bayesian networks are widely used to model uncertainty in the security context
because the conditional dependency fits perfectly with pre/post-condition and attack sce-
narios. Several works [19, 33, 34] utilize Bayesian networks for predicting high-level goal
of an attack. The use of Bayesian networks to model high level attack plans requires a
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mapping between specific alerts to attack categories, but it allows probability inference and
helps reduce from all possible future attack actions to a differentiable list of likely future
attacks. Figure 1.3 gives an example of Bayesian networks modeling applied to the security
context.
Consider a simplified attack scenario with four random variables representing the stages
of an attack. LetB denote “install Backdoor on the system”,C as “Compromise application
account and password”, M as “Monitor confidential transactions”, and S denote “Success-
fully obtain the confidential data”. The conditional dependencies of the random variables
can be described in Fig. 1.3. It indicates that the success of C (compromise application ac-
count and password) andM (monitor confidential transactions) are independent given their
parentB (install back door on system). Meanwhile, S (Successfully obtain the confidential




Figure 1.3: Example of Bayesian networks for attack prediction
In addition to the structure of the model, the parameters, i.e., the conditional proba-
bilities, of the model could potentially be derived from security knowledge. In particular,
a complete model will specify P (B), P (C|B), P (M |B) and P (S|C,M). Therefore, ac-
cording to the conditional dependencies, the joint distribution P (B,C,M, S) can be de-
composed into P (B)P (C|B)P (M |B)P (S|C,M). With simplified joint probability, one
can perform any inference on interested events.
There are many challenges when using Bayesian networks for cyber attack modeling
and prediction. The key problem for Bayesian networks is the assumption of the model.
Unlike other fields, the model structure and parameters have very high uncertainty for
multistage cyber attacks. Furthermore, training using up-to-date multistage data is almost
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impossible, as little ground truth exists for the stages a cyber attack goes through. Manually
specifying both the structure and the parameters may be error-prone for a large network.
Because of its limitations on scalability and the requirement of domain knowledge,
Bayesian networks are typically used to predict the high-level goal of an attack, for exam-
ple, whether the attacker will compromise an application account and password. On the
other hand, sequence modeling, e.g., [27, 35], has been utilized to predict more detailed
attack actions, e.g., the next attack target or service.
Generally speaking, sequence modeling techniques learn attack patterns from observed
attack sequences and predict the future actions of a given sequence based on the aggregate
likelihood of similar attack patterns. Soldo et al. [27] developed a cyber attack prediction
system by drawing an analogy from the context of recommendation systems [36], which
has been used to recommend movies based on similar users’ preferences. Figure 1.4 shows
an example of this analogy between recommendation systems and cyber attack prediction,
reproduced from Soldo et al. [27]. Figure 1.4(a) is the matrix denoting a user’s preference
in a recommendation system. Element ai,j represents whether the item i is borrowed by user
j. Figure 1.4(b) presents a similar idea in the context of cyber attacks. Similar preference
on the choice of targets from similarly behaving attacks are used to ‘recommend/predict’
the targets of a given attack.
(a) Recommendation system (b) Network attacks
Figure 1.4: An example of attack prediction using recommendation system [27]
A more explicit approach to extract the sequential dependencies between attack action
attributes within each attack sequence is to use a Variable Length Markov Model (VLMM
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[35]). Consider an ongoing attack withN observed actions {X1, X2, · · · , XN}. A model of
orderL assumes the current observed event is conditional depend on previousL events. The
probabilities are obtained from sample counts in historical and ongoing attack sequences.
A sequence of lengthN will contribute to the building of Lth order models for 1 ≤ L ≤ N .
More specifically, a sequence of length N will provide one sample to the nth order model,
two samples to the (N − 1)th order model, ... , and N samples to the 1st order model 2.
For implementation, a suffix tree can be used to record the samples and to store models
of different orders, which allows making predictions based on observed context in O(N)
time given a sequence of length N . Figure 1.5 shows the suffix tree corresponding to a
single sequence of ‘A,B,A,B,B’, where the edge weights indicate the number of times
the corresponding transition has occurred.
Figure 1.5: Examples of suffix tree for VLMM attack prediction
In reality, the suffix tree will be built with many attack sequences and continuously up-
dated with incoming alerts. The overall suffix tree represents the various possible Markov
relationships of different orders. For a given ongoing sequence with length N , the for oth
order model Po(XK), ∀ − 1 ≤ o ≤ N can be found from the suffix tree in O(N2) time,
which may be further simplified. The probability of next event in the sequence Po(XN+1)
can then be blended to make the prediction for next event as
2From the perspective of Bias-Variance trade-off [37], we may not need to learn a very higher order
model, because there is no sufficient data to train such order, and will lead to a very high variance. The
weight assignment for different order’s model takes this factor into account, and generally the higher order





wo · P (XK+1|XK−o+1, · · · , XK)
where wo is the weight associated with the oth order model, and
∑K
o=−1wo = 1. Note that
finite sequences should be penalized by their rarity and rewarded by their specificity. The
weights are designed to be adaptive to take into account the Bias-Variance trade-off [37].
Examples of the weight functions can be found in [38]. Fava [35] shows that there is no
significant performance difference when using different weight functions, as long as the
the weights satisfy the properties described above. Notice that the summation starts at −1.
The minus-one order model assigns all characters a probability of 1/|Ω| to prevent the zero
frequency problem [38]. The zero order model assumes all observations are independent
and holds the frequency count of all X ∈ Ω. For the given example in Fig. 1.5, after
observing ‘A,B,A,B,B’, we predict next event by considering the minus-one order model
(P0(A) = P0(B) = 0.5), zero order model (P1(A) = 0.4, P1(B) = 0.6), first order model
(P2(A|A) = 0, P2(B|A) = 0.5, P2(B|B) = 0.25, P2(B|B) = 0.25), all the way to the fifth
order model. The predictions in different models will be blended using different weights.
The VLMM model allows us to discover patterns within attack sequences without ex-
plicitly defining attack plans [35]. In fact, an ongoing attack sequence can match patterns
from numerous different types of preceding attack sequences. A VLMM combines the
probabilities associated with all matched patterns and produce a better guess.
1.5 Network attack data set
The lack of representative data set with comprehensive ground truth label always be the
fundamental challenge for network security research, from intrusion detection, alert corre-
lation to attack prediction. In this section, we will review widely used data set in aforemen-
tioned related work. Such review allows us to have better understanding of related work’s
objective and limitations.
In general, it is very difficult to acquire network data sets with ground truth label. For
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typical enterprise networks, the collection of IDS alerts and host logs would not be useful
for security research, because the data contains no label to the intrusion stage or specific
attacking behavior. There are also many privacy concerns to release the such data for
research purposes. Therefore, some milestone data set generated by government or research
institute, such as MIT Lincoln lab (DARPA data set [39] [40] [10]) and DEFCON data set
[41], are widely used across most security research.
In 1998 and 1999, DARPA intrusion detection evaluation group of MIT Lincoln Lab-
oratory collected and distributed two data set, DARPA 1998 and DARPA 1999, for IDS
evaluation purpose, i.e., the goal is investigating the performance of IDS detection en-
gine on reporting malicious activities. The data set was collected over several weeks in a
controlled environment to simulate an enterprise network. Various types of attack tools,
including probes, remote to local attacks, user to root attacks and DoS attacks are utilized
to conduct attacks (some of the attacks would not be valid today because the vulnerability
does not exist anymore, such as Ping of Death vulnerability). Finally, the data sets are
divided into training data set and testing data set and labeled with ground truth intrusion
activities.
In 2000, DARPA released two data sets with more sophisticated, multi-stage attack
scenarios. The attack goal is to install components and conduct DDoS attack in the target
network. The whole process has five attack phases, over the course of which the attacker
probes the network, breaks in to a host by exploiting the vulnerabilities, installs Trojan
DDoS software and eventually launches a DDoS attack from compromised hosts [42].
The data sets also contains detailed labels for intrusion activities over the phases. Un-
like DARPA1998 and DARPA1999 data set, whose purpose is validating the IDS detection
engine, DARPA 2000 data set contains multistage attack and is widely used to validate the
alert correlation research. In 2003, DARPA Cyber Panel Program released Grand Chal-
lenge Problem (GCP) for alert correlation evaluation[10]. Dataset is generated by an attack
simulator, which simulates two innovative worm attack scenarios in an enterprise network.
Data set includes multiple heterogeneous IDS alerts, and firewall logs generated by attacks
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as well as many background alerts that make alert correlation and attack strategy detec-
tion more challenging. GCP data set is one important benchmark data to evaluate alert
correlation system performance and the results are published in [10].
In addition to the DARPA data set, hacking competitions provide another useful re-
sources of understand network attacks. DEFCON is the world’s largest annual computer
hacker conference, and it organizes Capture the Flag (CTF) hacking competition every
year. During the competition, hackers are organized as teams, and vulnerable virtual ma-
chine images are provided to each team. The goals are protecting its own system and attack
other teams. DEFCON CTF 8 and CTF 9 data set (collected in 2000 and 2001) are also
used for intrusion detection and alert correlation research. University of California, Santa
Barbara and United States Military Academy West Point also organize International catch
the flag (iCTF) [43] and cyber defense exercise [44] hacking competitions and release the
traffic capture, IDS alerts and host logs to public.
Comparing to the benchmark data set created by DARPA, there are limited work using
the hacking competition data. Cipriano et al. [45] developed a production system called
Nexat. The approach groups intrusion alerts into attack sessions based purely on the source
and destination IP addresses recorded in the alerts. Then, statistics are recorded to deter-
mine which types of attack actions are more likely to be in the same session. Prediction of
future attack actions are, thus, chosen based on the overall statistics given recently captured
alerts. Nexat was evaluated using the iCTF competition dataset and has show reasonably
good prediction performance. However, it is unclear whether the simplistic definition of the
attack session and the statistics can be generalized and applicable for large-scale networks
with diverse attack goals.
On the other hand, in a larger scale it is possible to capture Internet attacks by passive
data collection. Passive attack data can be originated from worm propagation probing,
DDos and distributed stealthy scans. Such data sets that are widely used for host clustering,
includes CAIDA data set [46], Dshield data set [47], and other Honeypot data set. The
Cooperative Association for Internet Data Analysis (CADIA) is an organization based at
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the University of California’s San Diego supercomputer center. It collects several different
types of data at geographically and topologically diverse locations, and makes the data
available to the research community [46]. Similarly, DShield Internet Storm Center is an
organization that collects data for different contributes for discovering trends in activity,
confirming widespread attacks, or assisting in preparing better firewall rules [47].
As discussed earlier, Soldo et al. [27] adopted recommendation systems to predict vic-
tim networks based on similarly behaving malicious source IP. While theoretical sound and
performing well against the DShield dataset, the recommendation system approach does
not provide insights on how the attack actions happen sequentially or causally. Note that
DSheild data reports attack incidents on the Internet for blacklisting purposes, but does not
really contain sophisticated multistage attack strategies. It serves for a different purpose
of predicting victim networks from blacklisted source IP, but not predicting next attack ac-
tions among ongoing attacks in enterprise networks. Cheng et al. [48] developed a system
that measures similarity between attack progressions and project into future actions based
on most similar portions of the progressions seen in other attack sequences. The approach
is based upon the solution for the classical Longest Common Subsequence problem, and a
key novelty lies in the definition of the attack progression as a time-series of 3-digit num-
bers: the first digit indicates the zone distance between the source and destination IP, the
second digit stands for the network protocol used, and the third digit reflects the distance
between port clusters. From there, an attack sequence becomes a trajectory moving in this
3-digit space. While the idea is interesting and unique, the authors evaluated their system
against the DARPA dataset, which is limited in terms of attack sophistication as discussed
before.
Tables 1.4 and 1.5 summarize the aforementioned alert correlation and host clustering
works with data sets.
After reviewing the data sets that widely used in intrusion detection, alert correlation,
host clustering and attack prediction, we want to argue that, to the best of our knowledge,
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Table 1.4: Review of alert correlation and prediction work with data set
Ref. Framework Datasets
[12] Agg. Private datasets
[49] Corr., SA Private datasets
[14] Norm., Agg., Corr. Private datasets
[15] Agg., Corr. DARPA 2000, DEFCON 8
[50] Corr. DARPA 2000
[17] Agg., Corr. DARPA 1999
[18] Corr. DEFCON 9, DARPA GCP
[19] Corr. DARPA GCP
[20] Agg., Corr. Private datasets
[11] Agg., Corr. DARPA 1999, DARPA 2000, DEFCON 9, others
[21] Corr. DARPA 2000, private datasets
[27] Prediction Dshield dataset
[51] Prediction Private datasets
Table 1.5: Review of host clustering work with data set
Ref. Features Algorithm Datasets
[25] Flows and packets statistics X-means clustering Campus network traffic
[22] Flows and protocol statistics Hierarchical clustering CAIDA CoralReef traffic
[52] Relative uncertainty on flows Customized algorithm Internet backbone traffic
[24] Relative uncertainty on flows Spectral clustering CAIDA Internet traffic
[26] Statistics on flows Hierarchical clustering CAIDA Network Telescope
[27] Statistics on flows Customized algorithm DShield dataset
there is no work that comprehensively evaluate the performance for different alert analy-
sis system and take possible attack obfuscations into consideration. One of the reason is
because that the widely used data sets contain no ground truth on attack obfuscations.
For the works based on DARPA 1998, and 1999 data set, they are dealing with the
attacks without multiple steps and stepping stone hosts and there is no obfuscated attacks.
This is because the major goal of creating these two data sets is evaluating the performance
of IDS. For the works based on DARPA 2000 and GCP data set, most work are correlating
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the observable into complicated attack scenarios and eliminating unrelated alerts. The
variety and number of attacks in DARPA 2000 and GCP data set are also limited (one attack
with five phases and two worm attacks respectively). For the works based on DEFCON
data set, few attack obfuscation exists because the goal of hacking competition is capture
the flag instead of to be stealthy. On the other hand, most passive and honeypot data sets,
such as CAIDA data set and DShield data set are collections of malicious probings and
sophisticated attack with stealthy and decoy actions may not exist.
1.6 Overview the rest of the dissertation
Combating against large-scale, sophisticated attacks requires advances on various fronts,
including intrusion detection, alert correlation, host clustering, attack modeling and predic-
tion. Advances in intrusion detection [53, 3], though not perfect, have provided significant
observables or alerts that contain attributes of individual malicious actions. Alert corre-
lation, e.g., [20, 54, 14, 13, 55, 11, 16, 56, 57], processes and groups the observed alerts
based on their similarity or a pre-defined attack scenarios. Attack characterization and
prediction, e.g., [19, 58, 56, 59, 35, 51, 60], aims to analyze the temporal or sequential
characteristics of alert sequences of individual attack sources, so as to predict behaviors of
future actions. Host clustering, e.g., [22, 23, 25, 27, 24], explores the spatial characteristics
as well as packet and flow level anomalies among Internet hosts, to group them into clusters
of normal, infected or botnet hosts.
While the computational techniques used to analyze network attacks are advancing, the
attack tools, hacker skills and the attack strategies are also becoming more sophisticated.
This calls for new techniques to characterize attacks and their strategies when the critical
observables are embedded in the large volume and diverse malicious activities. In addition,
dealing with the attack obfuscations, e.g., IDS evasion, stealthy and decoy attack, will be
another challenge for network analysis. This chapter reviews and summarizes related work
shows that there is no work to address the attack obfuscations explicitly, to the best of our
knowledge.
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Chapter 2 will expand the discussion on attack characterization and modeling and dis-
cuss our works that investigate how temporal and spatial analyses can be used to discover
attack sources that play different roles in a network attack and to discover different attack
strategies. We will show for different algorithms understand and projecting next possible
actions is a daunting challenge, especially with noisy observations. Chapter 2 will end
by discussing the technical gap for dealing with noisy attack sequences, which gives us
the motivation of probabilistic modeling and inference for obfuscated network attack se-
quences.
Chapter 3 analyzes existing attack obfuscation techniques and derive attack obfuscation
models from the security domain knowledge. Eventually propose a framework of modeling
attack obfuscation explicitly to understand and quantitatively access the impact of obfus-
cation on current framework attack modeling, alert correlation and attack prediction.
To take advantage of the proposed framework, efficient algorithms are necessary to
preform probabilistic inference for given attack and obfuscation model. Chapter 4 derives
theorems and the algorithms to perform exact inference on proposed probabilistic model.
Given the inference algorithm, the problem of impact assessment for obfuscated sequences
is discussed and solved by Monte-Carlo approximation with desired accuracy.
Chapter 5 gives the simulation and results for different attack scenarios based on pro-
posed framework. And we will demonstrate how such knowledge can be used for security
analysis. Finally Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation. The detailed IDS alerts explanation,
theorem proofs are given in appendix.
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Chapter 2
Network attack characterization, mod-
eling and prediction
This chapter discusses our work on attack characterization modeling and prediction and
gives the motivation of the framework proposed in Chapter 3. We begin by assessing the
real attack data from hacking competition [61] and network telescope data produced by
UCSD [62]. Several useful features are proposed to describe different types of attacks,
and used to cluster the attack hosts into different groups [26] [28]. The idea is treating
hosts as instances and attacking relationship as social connections. Taking advantage of
social network analysis, e.g., centrality, community structure, influence concept, possible
coordinated attacks can be discovered [28]. In addition, this chapter discusses the novel
attack action transition feature [63] and spatial feature [64] to discover non-trivial attack
sources which are difficult for classical packet analysis to reveal. Finally, an attack predic-
tion model is presented [51] to show the challenge of dealing with noisy attack sequences
on simulated data set, which will lead to the discussion of attack obfuscation in Chapter 3.
2.1 Attack action sequence features
The mixture of organized cyber crimes, random attacks and computer virus against enter-
prise and government networks has led to overwhelming data to be analyzed. In this sec-
tion, we start our investigation from a more controlled environment, International Capture
the Flag (ICTF) hacking competition [43, 61], where participants are divided into teams
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to accomplish specific attack task. This enables us to investigate how coordinated, sophis-
ticated attacks work, which take advantage of multiple host level attack sources and are
conducted by an attacker or a group of attackers 1.
Table 2.1 gives an example coordinated attack by listing a sequence of Snort [53] IDS
alerts from real-world data. Basic alert attributes are listed, which include time, source IP,
target IP and attack signature. The attack signature is the Snort description of alert which
can be looked up in an IDS database to get more information about the attack action.
Table 2.1: An example of attack from real-world data
No. Time Src. IP Dest. IP Snort alert description
1 11:02:07 10.13.148.213 10.14.0.100 (portscan) TCP Portscan
2 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.1 ICMP PING NMAP
3 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.2 ICMP PING NMAP
4 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.3 ICMP PING NMAP
5 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.4 ICMP PING NMAP
6 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.5 ICMP PING NMAP
7 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.6 ICMP PING NMAP
8 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.7 ICMP PING NMAP
9 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.8 ICMP PING NMAP
10 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.9 ICMP PING NMAP
11 12:52:02 10.13.148.223 10.14.0.10 ICMP PING NMAP
12 14:36:15 10.13.148.217 10.14.1.9 (portscan) TCP Portscan
13 14:51:26 10.13.148.210 10.14.1.17 WEB-MISC cat%20 access
14 15:02:30 10.13.148.210 10.14.1.17 WEB-MISC cat%20 access
15 16:15:37 10.13.148.150 10.14.1.17 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
16 16:25:35 10.13.148.50 10.14.1.17 WEB-MISC /etc/passwd
17 17:00:22 10.13.148.150 10.14.1.17 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
18 17:11:03 10.13.148.150 10.14.1.17 WEB-MISC http directory traversal
There is a coordination among attack sources described in Table 2.1. According to
the alert description, Alerts #1–12 are reconnaissance actions, and Alerts #13–18 are web
1In general, it is hard to infer about the attacker(s), because the basic unit of most observable is at host
level (e.g., IP address) which can be easily spoofed.
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server vulnerability attempt actions. Although these two steps are closely related, i.e., vul-
nerability attempts depend on reconnaissance, but they originated from different sources.
Attack source 10.13.148.218 is utilized for probing across the target space within the sub-
net 10.14.0.x. After the reconnaissance, 10.13.148.210 and 10.13.148.150 are utilized to
try different vulnerabilities on web services2.
In fact, this is a simple example where the source IP subnet can be indicative of co-
ordinated behavior. This property occurs because the example is extracted from hacking
competition and participating teams are assigned specific range of source IPs. In the real
world where IP spoofing and zombie machines are common, inferring coordinated attack
sources by source IP alone will not be practical.
The use of multiple attack sources, possibly spoofed, make detection of coordinated
attack team more difficult. Table 2.2 includes a sequence of alert data from the ICTF
hacking competition [43]. Alerts triggered by two teams, ENOFLAG (EF) and Chocolate
Makers (CM), are listed in the table. Both teams utilize multiple attacking sources to work
together for achieving a certain goal. Basic alert attributes are listed, and the last column
shows the team assignment for each attack source.
The two teams shown in Table 2.2 have different strategies, i.e., the attacks performed
by two teams are different in both spatial and temporal domains. For the reconnaissance
stage, team EF is more centralized. EF mainly uses three hosts for comprehensive recon-
naissance. On the other hand, team CM is more distributed. Eleven sources are used for
probing the whole target space. If we use vertices to represent hosts and edges represent
attacks, the graphical representations 3 are very different for two teams, as shown in Fig.
2.1.
In the temporal domain, the sequences of attack sources by the two teams are also
different from each other. Team EF’s members perform TCP port sweep and port scan
2Note that, there are missing steps between Alert #12 and Alert #13. Vulnerability attempts are conducted
against 10.14.1.17, but no alerts indicates the target has been probed and discovered. This is because Snort
alert is one type of observed evidence, and it may not be comprehensive since current IDS does not perform
perfect detection.
3Table 2.2 only lists 8 alerts for each team. Figure 2.1 represents all actions from the two teams.
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Table 2.2: Examples of coordinated attacks with different strategies
Src. IP Dest. IP Snort alert description Team
10.13.1.86 10.100.113.48 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portsweep EF
10.13.1.86 10.120.113.42 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portsweep EF
10.13.1.86 10.199.113.36 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portsweep EF
10.13.1.32 10.100.113.24 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portsweep EF
10.13.1.32 10.100.113.9 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portscan EF
10.13.1.32 10.100.113.3 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portscan EF
10.13.1.32 10.100.113.8 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portscan EF
10.13.1.32 10.100.113.7 (portscan) TCP Filtered Portscan EF
10.33.1.13 10.100.133.1 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.12 10.100.133.2 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.16 10.100.133.3 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.16 10.100.133.4 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.17 10.100.133.5 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.12 10.100.133.6 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.20 10.100.133.7 ICMP PING NMAP CM
10.33.1.16 10.100.133.8 ICMP PING NMAP CM
(a) Spatial relationships of attacks by EF (b) Spatial relationships of attacks by CM
Figure 2.1: Example of spatial feature for coordinated attacks
against the target space. For team CM, six attack sources collaboratively use NMAP to
probe the target space. Therefore, for all alerts listed in the table, building the action
sequence for each attack source will lead to following results: team EF will have two
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sequences with length 4 and 6 respectively. Team CM will have ten sequences, which with
only one action.
Classical works may not be effective for treating coordinated attacks because the ac-
tions are originated from different attack sources. For alert correlation, with missing ob-
servables, it is very challenging to perform correlation by examining the pre-condition and
post-condition. For example, consider the attack conducted by team CM given in Table
2.2, coordinated reconnaissance, the pre/post-condition and attack scenario based approach
will fail to group the coordinating attackers. For attack characterization and prediction,
Bayesian networks and sequence modeling may be also inefficient in the presence of miss-
ing actions, because coordinated attacks will break the dependence structure of the model
(for both Bayesian networks and Markov model). Host clustering may work for same cases
where attack sources behave similarly, such as botnet DDoS attack, but may not work for
the general case of coordinated attack.
Classical works may not be effective on coordinated attacks because they mostly focus
on examining individual attack source’s actions, which will only give local information and
ignores the global information on the whole network. On the other hand, classical works
suggest Markov models and graph-based analysis can greatly benefit the analysis for large-
scale attacks. Using spatial features can provide additional insights about the relationship
of the attack sources and the use of sequence modeling can help for characterize the attack
behavior.
To analyze the spatial feature, an Attack Social Graph (ASG) can be defined as follows
to represent attacks in a given network [26] as follows:
An Attack Social Graph ASGT (V,E) is a directed graph representing the malicious
traffic within a time interval [0, T ], where a vertex v ∈ V is a host, and an edge e(u,v) ∈ E
exists if attacks are observed from u to v. Edge direction is from the attacking host to its
target.
In addition to the hacking competition data, ASGs exhibit many interesting patterns
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on other real-world data, which can provide us important insights on understanding coor-
dinated attacks. For example, consider two ASG subgraphs shown in Fig. 2.2 which are
extracted from CAIDA Network Telescope data [62, 65]. In Fig. 2.2(a) and 2.2(b), the
attack sources circled with the dotted line act similarly to attack one and only one target.
This is unlikely to happen by chance due to the large target space. On the other hand,
the two attack sources circled with the solid line in Fig. 2.2 are suspicious. They attack
several heavily attacked targets and are the common denominator among the all attacking
sources. One possible interpretation of such a situation is that this is a coordinated attack.
The sources in dotted circles are zombie machines controlled by the two sources in the
solid circles 4.
Figure 2.2: Example of ASG analysis
Based on the intuition given in Fig. 2.2, two approaches can be applied to analyze ASG.
The first approach is to calculate certain graph properties, such as centrality distribution
[66]. The second approach is to define the labels that have specific meanings, and analyze
attack sources with label sequences. For the spatial labeling approach, Attack Conspirator,
Heavily Attacked Target (HAT) can be defined as follows:
Let Tu
.
= {v | e(u,v) ∈ E, v ∈ Vt} be the targets attacked by u ∈ Vs, the attack
conspirators of u ∈ Vs, denoted as Cu, is a set of vertices: Cu
.
= {v | Tu∩Tv 6= ∅, v ∈ Vs},
4In the real-world data set, there is no ground truth suggesting how attack sources are coordinated. We col-
lect evidence to support our assumption. In this two example, inter-arrival time and geographical information
are consistent with the assumption of leader and zombie hosts.
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where Vt and Vs represent the set of targets and attacking sources respectively.
A heavily attacked target is a vertex v ∈ Vt, s.t. din(v) ≥ H , where H is a pre-selected
threshold.
Using these definitions, each source can be characterized by its spatial pattern. In par-
ticular, we can label the attack sources according to their behavior, and examine their roles
in coordinated attack. There are many disjoint subgraphs in each ASG, the first level of la-
beling is to differentiate the sources based on the type of subgraph they reside: one-to-one,
one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many relationships. The first three ASG subgraph
types are relatively easy to analyze in the security context. One-to-one relationships could
indicate the sensor was triggered by chance5 or focused attack on specific target. One-to-
many relationships represent service scanning on a set of targets. Many-to-one relationships
represent DDoS or coordinated attacks. In the case of many-to-many subgraphs, additional
factors are needed to differentiate the attack sources. Specifically, we use the HAT to differ-
entiate whether a source is part of a potentially coordinated attack, i.e., unlikely to happen
by chance. The attack sources that do not have any HAT are further differentiated depend-
ing on whether they have any Heavily Attacking Conspirator (HAC). The idea here is to
examine whether the source, which can be attacking because of mis-configuration or it has
a specific target, has a conspirator that is part of a potentially coordinated attack. Note that,
the sources that have at least one HAT must have HACs. We further differentiate sources
with only one HAT or multiple targets. Figure 2.3 summarizes our labeling approach.
Spatial relationships among attack sources and targets are important features of coor-
dinated attacks. With the degree centrality measure and labeling scheme, one can charac-
terize the possible role for given attacking sources. Figure 2.4 gives the result of degree
centrality based clustering results. In Du’s work [26], connectivity attributes and hierarchi-
cal clustering are used for categorize the coordinated attack. Figure 2.4(a) and 2.4(b) are
the clustering results at the top level and Fig. 2.4(c) and 2.4(d) show the corresponding
5The spatial pattern example is extracted from UCSD data set, in which the alert can be triggered by
chance such as mis-configuration. In hacking competition data, we do not have such a case.
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attack sources in the ASG.
Figure 2.3: Attack source labeling
(a) Dendrogram of attack sources (b) Cluster of attack sources
(c) Cluster C in ASG (d) Cluster B in ASG
Figure 2.4: Degree centrality based attack sources clustering
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By analyzing the clusters from Fig. 2.4(a), we find several sets of interesting collabora-
tive attack patterns. First, the five feature points within cluster C are actually five distinct
attack sources that attack a large number of targets within the network monitored by the
Network Telescope. These five sources are outliers on the 2D plane (see cluster C in Fig.
2.4(b)), it is shown in Fig. 2.4(c) to identify these sources in the ASG. Second, some attack
sources form cluster B since these sources all have a “special” conspirator 0.211.214.160
6, which is an attack sources in Cluster C and has out-degree 18, 920. Being a conspira-
tor of such hosts makes their features significantly different from others and thus forms a
cluster. Figure 2.4(d) identifies some of the Cluster B sources in a zoom-in view of the
corresponding ASG.
For the spatial labeling approach, by analyzing the joint probabilistic distribution over
time of the spatial labels, the patterns can be extracted from a very large training set
(2,322,134 attack sources). For convenience, let d(p) denote the number of unique values
in a label pattern p. We define this value as the diversity of an attack sequence. Further-
more, let {a, b} denote the label patterns with d(p) = 2 that contain x and y regardless
of the order over which they occur. Similarly, we can define {a, b, c} and {a, b, c, d} for
patterns with d(p) = 3 and d(p) = 4, respectively. Figure 2.5 shows the probabilities of
occurrence for label patterns with d(p)=1, 2, 3 and 4., for which there are a total of 8, 28,
56, 78 patterns in each set, respectively. The most popular label pattern sets are highlighted
in the subfigures. These patterns represent the cases where DDoS and distributed scanning
occurred and sometimes switched targets.
The connectivity features are also effective for differentiating different attack behav-
ior. Consider two different probing behaviors: web probing and share probing. The web
probing attacks ports 80, 8000 and 8080, and it is widely used to identify live targets at the
beginning of the reconnaissance. The destination ports of share probing include ports 139
and 445, and it is also used for host discovery and OS fingerprinting. The spatial label can
6For anonymity reason, in this chapter, the first byte of IP address from real-world data (UCSD CAIDA
data set) is masked with 0.
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(a) Pattern sets for d(p) = 1 (b) Pattern sets for d(p) = 2
(c) Pattern sets for d(p) = 3 (d) Pattern sets for d(p) = 4
Figure 2.5: Spatial pattern sets probabilities
effectively differentiate these two different behaviors.
(a) Target IP (b) Target port (c) Target IP (d) Target port
(e) Label sequence (f) Label sequence
Figure 2.6: Label sequence comparison for different attacking strategies
Figure 2.6 is an example to compare the target IPs, target ports, and label sequences
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of two attack sources from each group. The subfigures (a), (b) and (e) on the left show
the behavior of web probe and those on the right (c), (d) and (f) show the share probe for
comparison. Note that target IP and target ports are two key factors to describe an attacking
behavior. The target IPs and ports are shown in a 212 by 212 IP space and a 28 by 28 port
space. Subfigure (e), (f) provide the corresponding label sequence.
Comparing web probe with share probe, their target port and IP selections are distinct.
In addition to ports 80, 8080 and 8000, web probe also attacks other variations, such as
ports 808, 1080 and 2080. share probe only attacks ports 139 and 445. In terms of target
IP, web probe often explores randomly over the IP space. share probe focuses on scanning
individual subnets – the strips in (c) represent the continuous target IPs.
The label sequences of different strategies are very different from one to another. For
web probe, the majority of the labels are Label-2s and Label-5s, along with other non-zero
labels spreading over 24 hours. In such case, it is more likely to be an automatic script
attack, and have few HATs (Label-6 and Label-7). For share probe, the majority of the
labels are Label-0s with occasional occurrences of Label-2s, Label-5s and Label-7s. This
suggests share probe is somewhat sporadic with short breaks, which is consistent with it
scanning on a subnet basis. Furthermore, Label-7 will also occur sometimes because the
concentration of target IPs is likely to hit some HATs.
As discussed earlier, the challenge of discovering coordinated attacks is due to the
stealthy actions distributed across multiple attack sources. The spatial features can effec-
tively discover such sophisticated attacks buried in the overwhelming data. For example,
consider an attack source 0.86.249.218, which sent 59 malicious packets over 24 hours in
the Network Telescope data set [65] (the whole data set contains over 109 packets).
Table 2.3 gives the details of the first 10 packets if only traffic volume and target range
are considered. There are 21 distinct targets, seemingly randomly selected, and 4 distinct
ports (ports 80, 8080, 808 and 8000). There is no evidence suggesting this attack source is
important and worthy of further investigation. However, the label sequence for this attack
source suggests it could be indicative of advanced attack, where the hacker is switching
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Table 2.3: Packet level details for attack source 0.86.249.218
Time Source IP Target IP Protocol Target port
19:11:08 0.86.249.218 0.145.245.69 TCP 80
19:11:21 0.86.249.218 0.145.245.69 TCP 80
19:27:39 0.86.249.218 0.111.153.210 TCP 80
19:28:53 0.86.249.218 0.140.180.153 TCP 8080
19:27:40 0.86.249.218 0.111.153.210 TCP 80
19:28:52 0.86.249.218 0.140.180.153 TCP 8080
19:30:11 0.86.249.218 0.141.139.196 TCP 80
19:29:48 0.86.249.218 0.141.139.196 TCP 80
19:30:22 0.86.249.218 0.141.68.93 TCP 80
19:27:36 0.86.249.218 0.111.153.210 TCP 80
between compromised hosts, which can be exhibited by the ASG subgraphs. Therefore
we further verify our discoveries by examining the corresponding ASG over time. Figure
2.7(a) to 2.7(d) give the ASG subgraphs in four consecutive time frames T6 to T9. The
attack source 0.86.249.218 is highlighted with the solid circle. For better visualization,
only the attack source, its targets and its conspirators are shown. The extracted ASGs
show that the attack source is not a inconsequential attacker. Although the malicious traffic
volume and the out-degree of the attack source are both small, most of its targets are heavily
attacked. During the entire 20 minutes, the attack methodically narrowed down the point-
of-interest and increased the volume of attacks on specific targets. At T6, it attacked 6
targets, and 4 of them were also attacked by other sources. At T7, it reduced the range of
targets by 1. Among the remaining 5 targets, 2 were attacked by others. For T8, the target
declined to 4, but 2 of them were heavily attacked by 7 and 14 other sources, respectively.
In addition, there were 3 suspicious sources that attacked both HATs. Note that, in a large
targets space, it is unlikely to have 4 hosts simultaneously select the same two targets. One
can hypothesize that these attack sources are controlled as zombie machines or collaborated
together for the attack. Finally, at T9 the source reduced the attack to only three targets
and focused on one to perform comprehensive attacks using multiple hosts. This example
illustrates that an attack source with transitions between Label-6 and Label-7 can be critical
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and worth further investigation.
(a) Attacks in T6 (b) Attacks in T7 (c) Attacks in T8 (d) Attacks in T9
Figure 2.7: Label Sequence and ASG Subgraphs for Attack Source 0.86.249.218
2.2 Predict possible attack actions
Connectivity features as well as the computational models based on the proposed features
allow the discovery of notorious attacking sources and non-trivial attacking sources. On
the other hand, one may want to focus on one specific attacking source and predict what
next attack action may happen. Sequence modeling and prediction will allow us for such
tasks.
As discussed in Chapter 1, Variable Length Markov Model (VLMM) has been used to
adaptively extract patterns in cyber attacks [35]. Though showing promising results, the
VLMM approach focused on extracting patterns and projecting based on specific attributes
of IDS alerts. A projection made based on one attribute may not match to that based on
another. Consider a simplified example shown in Table 2.4.
The VLMM predictions will suggest ‘192.168.3.x,’ ‘UDP,’ and ‘WEB-MISC http di-
rectory traversal’ as the top choices for attributes, tip (subnet), prt, and dsc, respectively.
A granularity at the subnet level is used for better capturing the movements of the at-
tack across the accessible regions (collision domains that are typically defined similarly
by router firewall rules). The per attribute choices, however, cannot be combined di-
rectly since: (1) the ‘HTTP request’ does not utilize ‘UDP’ protocol and (2) the subnet
192.168.3.x in the test network does not contain a web server. Therefore, it is necessary to
develop an intelligent and robust combination.
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Table 2.4: Per attribute prediction example by VLMM.









SMTP sendmail 5.5.5 exploit 0.4349
WEB-MISC http directory traversal 0.5513
FTP adm scan 0.0138
The per alert attribute VLMM predictions need to be transformed to projection scores
with respect to the target machines for combination. Two projections scores, Projt and
Projd, are derived based on VLMM predictions based on ‘tip (subnet)’ and ‘dsc, respec-
tively. The Projt(h) represents how likely h may be targeted next according to the order
of subnets that have been attacked, and is referred to as the IP projection. The Projd(h)
is based on the sequence of service exposure being exploited, referred to as the exposure
projection. Let pt(·) and pd(·) be the probabilities derived based on VLMM with respect to
‘tip (subnet)’ and ‘dsc, respectively. Also let N(h) be the subnet h resides, and E(h) be






To combine Projt and Projd, we chose to use fuzzy inference, for its effectiveness as
an information fusion tool that mimics human analytics [67, 68]. There are two types of
fuzzy inference systems, Mamdani and Sugeno [69]. We utilized Sugeno System since it
guarantees continuity of output surface. The system has two components: the membership
functions for fuzzifying inputs and the inference rules for combination.
Membership functions can be derived from examining the distribution of the inputs.
Figure 2.8 shows a scatter plot of Projt versus Projd for all targets throughout a training
dataset. It shows that the exposure projection is mostly evenly distributed between 0 and 1,
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while there is a concentration of inputs between 0 and 0.1 for Projt. Interestingly, different
experimental datasets are tested and the results scatter plots are similar. This is due to the
fact that while many machines are hidden behind firewalls in most instances, the estimation
based on service exposure do not account for such and produce uniform distribution with a
sufficiently large set of services and machines.
Figure 2.8: A scatter plot of Projt versus Projd of all hosts
In order to differentiate within the concentration region of [0,0.1], more membership
functions are used for Projt. Figure 2.9 shows the membership function design: 5 mem-
bership functions and 3 membership functions are used to fuzzify the Projt and Projd,
respectively.
Given the membership functions, there are 15 inference rules combining Projd and
Projt. The rules places a higher emphasis on Projt because human analysts typically give
more credit to where the attack has reached instead of what services have been attacked.
Table 2.5 gives a tabular view of the rules. The elements (aij) in Table 2.5 are aggregated to
determine the overall projection score (projection) based on the antecedents (uij) defined
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(a) Exposure projection (b) IP Projection
Figure 2.9: The fuzzy membership functions













uij , µi(Projt) · µj(Projd),
and µi and µj denote the ith and the jth membership function of Projt and Projd.
Table 2.5: Fuzzy inference rules used to combine VLMM outputs
Projt
Projd low 1 low 2 low 3 medium high
low 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
medium 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
high 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.8 1.0
The resulting overall system can be illustrated using the input/output surface plot shown
in Figure 2.10. Note that the surface quickly rises in the dense region of IP exposure, to
differentiate the inputs and reduce false positives. The changes with respect to the exposure
projection is gradual to reflect the uniform distribution described earlier.
Attack prediction by VLMM prediction and fuzzy combination (F-VLMM) were tested
via simulation. Simulated multi-stage attacks were generated using the simulator developed
by Kuhl et al. [70] on two networks, shown in Figures 2.11 and 2.12. The two networks
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Figure 2.10: The I/O surface plot of the fuzzy combination system
were designed to represent two types of enterprise networks. Network A (6 subnets, 11
servers and 4 clusters of hosts (24 hosts total), containing 31 services (15 types total), in-
terconnected via 4 routers) represents the case where each service is implemented in only
one or few dedicated servers, while Network B implements about 10 instances per ser-
vice. Network B (9 subnets, 23 servers and 8 clusters of hosts (130 hosts total), containing
more than 300 services (37 types total), interconnected via 8 routers) also has more total
machines and service types, representing a larger network with a more redundant configura-
tion. Both networks were configured with firewall rules restricting traffic between different
parts of the network. The entire sets of rules are too large to be included in this paper, but
the general idea is that the departments (shaded boxes in the figures) that have their own
servers or reside deeper in the network will have more restricted rules.
A total of 1,000 random attacks containing 6,854 alerts were generated for Network A,
and 1,500 attacks, composed of 11,697 alerts, were generated for Network B. The data set
contains a mixture of ‘stealthy’ attacks where some steps are not observed, and attacks with
different ‘efficiency’ level. An attack is most efficient if it utilizes the minimum number of
stepping stones to get to the final target in the network.
For Network B, specific data sets with efficiency level of 0.8, 0.5, and 0.3 were created.
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Figure 2.11: Network A used for attack prediction simulation
For the details of the parameter settings, the readers may refer to Kuhl et al. [70]. A number
of targets were chosen for both data sets, representing a broad range of servers and hosts in
different departments within the corresponding network.
Given the datasets, the algorithms were tested to determine whether they can accurately
project the next attacked target given the already observed events. Cyber attack projection
aims at providing a ranked list of projected targets, instead of a prediction of what exactly
will happen next. Therefore, the performance of the algorithm was evaluated by examining
the percentile ranking of the attacked target one step prior to it being attacked. Because
there could be ties in the projection scores, the results presented in this paper are shown
in the form of [lower, upper], representing the interval of percentile ranking of targets
received the same score as the attacked target.
Table 2.6 shows the average percentile rank in the datasets by running the F-VLMM
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Figure 2.12: Network B used for attack prediction simulation
prediction. The results show that both algorithms work well for Network A and Network
B. 7
Table 2.6: Projection performance achieved by F-VLMM for the various datasets
Net A Net B
High Eff. Medium Eff. Low Eff.
[81%,88%] [85%,88%] [84%,88%] [81%,84%]
The F-VLMM performs well for both networks because (1) the VLMM captures the
attack patterns in both targeted subnets and targeted service exposures, and (2) the fuzzy
combination successfully differentiates the attacked targets from other targets. Figure 2.13
shows the number of targets receiving different threat scores when all the targets are con-
sidered (top) and only the attacked targets are considered. The majority of attacked tar-
gets receive high threat scores. The same fuzzy functions and rules are used for different
7Note that very little simulation or analytical results have been reported for cyber attack projection, and
there exist no public real multistage cyber attack dataset. Our discussion of the results, thus, focuses on the
benefits and limitations of the presented algorithms, but does not suggest exact performance if used in real
networks.
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datasets, showing its robustness.
Figure 2.13: The number of targets receiving different threat scores: all targets (top) vs.
only attacked targets (bottom)
While it may not be obvious from the overall results, the F-VLMM generally performs
better for efficient attacks. Essentially, efficient attacks use only specific stepping stones
without deviating from reaching the final goal. Therefore, patterns are easier to capture.
There are instances where attacks deviate from the identified patterns, and the F-VLMM
could perform not as well, at least temporarily. Specific case studies are presented next to
illustrate the pros and cons of proposed approaches.
In order to provide a deeper understanding of the algorithms on different types of at-
tacks, we presents a case study with three attacks that target the same mail server residing in
Department F in Network B. Table 2.7 shows the attack steps (only sip and tip are shown)
of a high efficiency attack. The attack starts with compromising the external mail server
(Step 1-3), then tries to access an internal server (Step 4). After that, a member of the host
cluster in Department A (Step 5-7) is compromised to access Department C and E, to reach
the final target.
Also shown in Table 2.7 are the percentile rank intervals of the targeted machines one
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Table 2.7: A high efficiency attack with percentile rank interval achieved by F-VLMM
Step Source IP Target IP Percentile Rank
1 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 N/A
2 237.22.202.140 192.168.1.3 [96.78%,100%]
3 178.87.46.91 192.168.1.3 [93.75%,96.88%]
4 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.6 [96.88%,100%]
5 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.8 [96.88%,100%]
6 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.9 [93.75%,96.88%]
7 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.18 [93.75%,96.88%]
8 192.168.2.18 192.168.4.22 [96.75%,96.88%]
9 192.168.4.22 192.168.6.111 [90.63%,93.75%]
10 192.168.6.111 192.168.7.9 [93.75%,96.88%]
step before each attack. Note that this is extracted from the overall results shown in overall
results. It is clearly evident that F-VLMM consistently performs exceptionally for this
multistage attack with the percentile ranked above 90% and many ranked above 95%. This
suggests that VLMM can almost perfectly capture the pattern exhibited by attacks that
go straight to the target 192.168.7.9 even if it is hidden behind 4 subnets: 192.168.1.x,
192.168.2.x, 192.168.4.x, and 192.168.6.x (i.e., 3 layers of firewalls).
Table 2.8 shows a ‘less efficient’ attack that has the same final target 192.168.7.9 as the
previous attack. The projection performance by F-VLMM is significantly lower for Steps
5, 9, 10, 13, and 14. Step 9 attempted to attack the server 192.168.2.2 while it has already
penetrated deeper into 192.168.4.x subnet. Typically such an activity is done prior to further
penetration attempts. For Steps 10 and 13, the attack probes into Subnets 192.168.5.x
and 192.168.3.x even though they do not contain the target machine. The majority of the
dataset, however, contains high efficiency attacks and the model adaptively trained will not
rank those seemly unrelated victims high. Because a wide variety of subnets have been
visited, F-VLMM is not able to project accurately the real target, and, hence, performs
poorly in the final step.
Table 2.9 illustrates a stealthy attack that has the same target as the previous cases, but
can perform some intermediate steps without being detected. There is one or more missing
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Table 2.8: A low efficiency attack with percentile rank interval achieved by F-VLMM
Step Source IP Target IP Percentile Rank
1 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 N/A
2 237.22.202.140 192.168.1.3 [90.63%,93.75%]
3 178.87.46.91 192.168.1.3 [93.75%,96.88%]
4 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.6 [96.88%,100%]
5 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.6 [50.00%,53.13%]
6 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.9 [84.38%,87.50%]
7 192.168.2.9 192.168.4.35 [81.25%,84.38%]
8 192.168.2.9 192.168.4.16 [96.88%,100%]
9 192.168.2.9 192.168.2.2 [37.5%,40.63%]
10 192.168.2.2 192.168.5.5 [40.63%,43.75%]
11 192.168.2.2 192.168.4.40 [84.38%,87.5%]
12 192.168.4.40 192.168.6.5 [84.38%,87.5%]
13 192.168.2.2 192.168.3.17 [18.75%,21.88%]
14 192.168.6.5 192.168.7.9 [3.13%,6.25%]
steps between Steps 3 and 4. Step 3 compromised 192.168.2.7, but Step 4 shows an internal
machine 192.168.2.9 being used as a stepping stone. Assuming there is no insider threat,
192.168.2.9 must be compromised before it attacks 192.168.4.20, which, in turns, is used
to attack other machines. Because the data is generated via a simulator that contains ground
truth of the attack, we know there is no insider threat and there is indeed an attack step not
being detected. The missing step has affected the F-VLMM in recognizing the pattern and
thus the projection is not as accurate as in the first case.
Table 2.9: A stealthy attack with percentile rank interval by F-VLMM
Step Source IP Target IP Percentile Rank
1 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 N/A
2 237.22.202.140 192.168.1.4 [96.88%,100%]
3 192.168.1.3 192.168.2.7 [96.88%,100%]
4 192.168.2.9 192.168.4.20 [75%,78.13%]
5 192.168.4.20 192.168.6.113 [75%,78.13%]
6 192.168.6.113 192.168.7.9 [81.25%,84.38]
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2.3 Technical gap for dealing noisy attack sequences
This chapter presents our works on attack characterization and prediction. Drawing the
analogy from social network analysis, an Attack Social Graph is defined to represent the
relationship between attack sources. Applying the notion of degree centrality and agglom-
erative hierarchical clustering, various types of collaborative attack, or spatial patterns are
discovered. These spatial patterns enable a labeling scheme for attack sources over time,
resulting in an integrated spatial and temporal model for attack sources. Markov models are
developed to differentiate and infer cyber attack strategies worthy of further investigation.
The experiment results using Network Telescope and ICTF data show that the integrated
spatial and temporal analyses can provide additional insights for high impact attacks that
are not trivial by applying traditional statistical or anomaly analyses. Our work [26] [63]
[51] offers a viable approach to analyze attack strategies by exploring not only the sequen-
tial relationship between the attack actions performed by an individual attack source, but
also the relationships exhibited in attack actions among attack sources.
On the other hand, based on the features extracted, network security can benefit from
projection of multistage cyber attacks, where likely future targets can be identified for
timely responses. Projecting cyber attacks requires the history of patterns exhibited in at-
tacks’ progression in the network. While previous work introduced attack assessments
based on these characteristics, our work revisits them and presents a fuzzy ensemble tech-
niques to combine the attack projection estimates. Thorough analysis via simulation are
presented to provide insights toward ensemble characterization of multistage attacks. The
F-VLMM predictor is developed to effectively capture sequential patterns of attack pro-
gression and uses Fuzzy inference to combine estimates based on subnet and services vis-
ited. Simulation results have shown F-VLMM’s superior performance for ‘high efficiency
attacks’. For attacks deviating from the extracted pattern due to observation noise, decoy,
or stealthy attack actions, the F-VLMM have limited performance.
Despite making some progress on characterizing, modeling and prediction of network
attacks, there is still a technical gap for dealing with noisy attack sequences. In fact, even
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evaluating the performance of alert correlation is an open challenge and there are few work
compares the performance and robustness of different alert correlation systems [10]. This
is partially due to the lack of publicly available data set that contains variations of network
structure and vulnerabilities (as discussed in Chapter 1.5). To the best of our knowledge,
Haines et al. [10] was the only one who presented a comparative study, showing a large per-
formance variation by different alert correlation systems: the combined attack recognition
rate varies between 13.98% and 94.62% and the combined target recognition rate varies
between 17.14% and 48.57%. A key reason for the low recognition rates and performance
variation comes from the imperfectly observed attack sequences that contain intentionally
or unintentionally removed, injected, or altered observations. These noisy action obser-
vations can negatively impact the recognition or classification of the attack sequences in
accordance to the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [71]
or other attack models.
The lessons we learned from attack action prediction and the technical gap of dealing
with noisy attacks give us the motivation of investigating attack obfuscations and formally
model the attack obfuscation explicitly to enable us to understand and quantitatively assess
the impact of obfuscation on current framework of attack modeling, alert correlation and
attack prediction. The formal framework of modeling the joint distribution of clean attack
sequence and obfuscated attack sequence will be presented in the next chapter. Further,
by carefully studying attack obfuscation strategies, different types of obfuscation models
will be developed and analyzed, whereas the analysis will be enabled by efficient inference
algorithms presented in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 3
Modeling obfuscated attack sequences
3.1 Attack obfuscation and countermeasures
3.1.1 Review of network attack obfuscation
Ptacek [72] pointed out that because of the inherent problems of Network Intrusion Detec-
tion System (NIDS), attack obfuscations are inevitable. The key problem is that NIDS is
only a monitor system that mimic the target system response. It is almost impossible to
mimic various types of the operating system, TCP/IP stack implementation as well and dif-
ferent applications. In addition, the widely used NIDSs are signature-based, i.e., keeping a
database of malicious signatures and apply pattern matching techniques for classification of
observed actions. Therefore, it is very possible to perform attack obfuscation by breaking
the pattern-matching engine in NIDS.
Packet-level obfuscation takes advantage of the knowledge of TCP/IP stack to perform
stealthy or decoy actions. Source IP spoofing [73] is a widely used technique to hide the
real identity of the attacker. Moreover, more and more compromised machines are utilized
as stepping stones to conduct complicated attacks [3]. Taking advantage of compromised
hosts, the attacker can easily hide crucial actions and/or inject irrelevant actions to distract
analysts with a large number of actions from various origination.
In addition, it is also possible for attackers to inject noisy attack actions because of
public available malicious signatures. The idea of noisy action injection is trying to break
the alert analysis engine (causal relationship) but not NIDS. Separating the casual relation-
ship between attack actions can be effective to mislead security analyst, e.g., mis-classify a
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severe intrusion incident into a script kiddie scenario.
Figure 3.1 gives an example of a Snort [53] rule on RPC sadmind vulnerability attempt.
There are hex code in content attribute to describe the attack signature. Table 3.1 is the
payload to exploit RPC Sadmind vulnerability, which explains the hex code shown in Fig.
3.1. In this example, the attacker can use a hex editor to create a binary file that contains the
signature. After establishing TCP connection on an open port, loading the crafted payload
will trigger the alert and inject noisy observation.
alert tcp $EXTERNAL_NET any -> $HOME_NET
1024:(msg:"RPC sadmind query with root
credentials attempt TCP"; flow:to_server
established; content:"|00 01 87 88|";
depth:4; offset:16; content:"|00 00 00
01 00 00 00 01|"; within:8; distance:4;
byte_jump:4,8,relative,align; content:
"|00 00 00 00|"; within:4; metadata:
policy security-ips drop; classtype:
misc-attack; sid:2255; rev:10;)
Figure 3.1: An example of RPC Sadmind Snort rule
Table 3.1: Hex payload and explanation for RPC Sadmind Snort rule
HEX Code Explanation
00 89 9c e2 the request id, a random uint32
00 00 00 00 rpc type (call = 0, response = 1)
00 00 00 02 rpc version (2)
00 01 87 88 rpc program (0x00018788 = sadmind)
00 00 00 0a rpc program version (0x0000000A = 10)
00 00 00 01 rpc procedure (0x00000001 = 1)
00 00 00 01 credential flavor (1 = auth unix)
As discussed earlier, the basic obfuscation actions are packet level obfuscations. Next,
we want to discuss the obfuscation techniques in strategy level, i.e., going beyond manip-
ulating individual events, how to use basic obfuscation actions together to achieve attack
44
strategy level deception. This work considers three categories of obfuscation strategies:
action alteration, action insertion and action removal. These general categories are based
upon experiences in working with security experts during the DARPA cyber insider threat
project [74]. These categories will be discussed below with examples. The obfuscation ex-
amples assume an enterprise network environment. Specifically the network shown in Fig.
3.2 is used, which is the same as that used in Chapter 2 attack prediction. The observations
of the network attack are alerts from Snort IDS.
The term noise attack sequence is a general term and can be used to describe an ob-
served alert sequence with intentional (attacker’s obfuscation) or unintentional noise (such
as IDS sensor failure). This work only considers the case of attacker’s intentional obfus-
cation. The term noise and obfuscation will be interchangeably used. The term clean
sequence will be used to represent the original attack on selected target without using ob-
fuscation techniques.
Figure 3.2: Network used for illustrating obfuscation techniques
45
Action alteration
For signature-based detection engine, modifying the payload and craft a signature for in-
tended alerts can be easily done. The attacker can alter alerts to hide the true origination
and attack characteristic. Further, sometimes, to achieve the same reconnaissance or intru-
sion objective, many actions can be interchangeable to be played. Changing the order of
attacking actions can create equivalent sequence which can make the whole sequence more
versatile and avoid being detected by matching to the classical intrusion sequence pattern.
Figure 3.2 is an example of action alteration obfuscation. The attacking source is coming
from the Internet and the target is an enterprise web sever.
Table 3.2: An example scenario of action alteration obfuscation
Obs. # Clean alert sequence Obfuscated alert sequence
1* PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows ICMP PING NMAP
2* PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Oracle Solaris
3* PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows PROTOCOL-ICMP PING LINUX/*BSD
4* SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt SCAN nmap
5 WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt
6 WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt
The first three alerts in the clean alert sequence are indicative to the attacker’s OS.
By using different tools or changing the time-to-live filed for ICMP ping, the attack can
generate alerts that look like to be originated from other OS platform, while achieving the
same reconnaissance goal. Such obfuscation can be misleading for some alert correlation
systems and cause alert correlation failure.
Action insertion
Inserting overwhelming alerts can separate related attack actions to affect the analysis en-
gine, e.g., increasing miss-classification of attack strategy. Even more, overwhelming alerts
can cause Denial-of-Services (DoS) on the analysis engine, because the capacity of all alert
analysis engine are limited [10, 72].
There are many ways to perform noise injection. For example, one simple way of in-
jecting alerts would be writing a script to keep performing scanning or getting sensitive file
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actions from a target to trigger the corresponding detection rules. Although such activity
will easily expose attacker’s IP and can be easily blocked by system administrator, using
such simple tricks to injecting alerts on compromised host (attackers will not be worried
about expose the IP for compromised host) can be effective to dilute the original attack
traces. An example of noise injection scenario is shown in Table 3.3. Refering to the net-
work diagram in Fig. 3.2, the attacking source IP are two external IPs. Actions #1, #9, #14
come from one source IP and the others are originated from another IP. The target is on
the external web server (subnet 192.168.1.x). Table 3.3 lists 16 action observation window,
and obfuscated actions are labeled with asterisk.
Table 3.3: An example scenario of noise injection obfuscation
Obs. # Clean alert sequence Obfuscated alert sequence
1 SCAN nmap TCP SCAN nmap TCP
2* SHELLCODE Metasploit meterpreter connection attempt SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
3* WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
4* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
5* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
6* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
7* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
8* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
9 SHELLCODE Metasploit meterpreter connection attempt
10* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
11* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
12* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
13* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
14 WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt
15* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
16* SERVER-WEBAPP /etc/passwd file access attempt
Comparing the clean alert sequence and obfuscated sequence, the critical attack ac-
tions, #9 and #14 are buried into the sensitive file assess attempt alerts, which can be easily
generated with automatic script using HTTP GET. At the same time, the causal relation-
ship between the clean alert sequence, i.e., reconnaissance then intrusion attempts, are also
broken by the noise alerts. Note that, such action injection obfuscation may not be effec-
tive for all of the alert correlation engines, because for some alert correlation systems, the
first step is group alerts by attacking source IP. However, this approach has its drawbacks,
grouping by attacking IP could make the analysis for coordinated attack more difficult.
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Therefore some other alert correlation will not group by IP and could suffer from this such
alert injection obfuscation.
Another example of noise injection is self-throttling, where by replaying the actions
happened before, the attacker can have higher chance hide the most recent intrusion state,
e.g., host discovering, service scanning, privilege escalation, etc.. An example of self-
throttling is shown in Table 3.4. The attacking source IP is from Internet, and the target is
the external web server. Self-throttling actions are marked with asterisk.
Table 3.4: An example scenario of self-throttling obfuscation
Obs. # Clean alert sequence Obfuscated alert sequence
1 TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
2* ICMP PING NMAP TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
3 SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt ICMP PING NMAP
4* WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
5* WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt ICMP PING NMAP
6 SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt
7* ICMP PING NMAP
8* TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
9* SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt
10* SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt
11 WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt
12* SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt
13* WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt
14 WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt
The clean attack sequence in Table 3.4 can be viewed as three stages, the first stage
is performing host discovery and the second stage is performing scanning services and
identifying the vulnerability followed by trying to exploit the buffer overflow vulnerability.
On the other hand, the obfuscated sequence can be misleading and telling a different story,
it is hard to say the attack made any progression, e.g., the target has been discovered or
the vulnerability has been identified, but the attacker keep performing low level probing
actions.
Another example of noise injection is activity splitting, which is another obfuscation
technique to avoid certain patterns that can be triggered by some detection engines. In the
packet level, spiting sensitive payload and send the payload though different packet is a
widely used technique to perform detection evasion [75]. Similarly, in the alert level, one
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can split a malicious signature into multiple steps, and fragment actions can look normal.
For example, a long sequence of failed log-in attempts is indicative to a dictionary based
password brute-force attack. To be more stealthy, the attacker can split one long sequence
into multiple smaller sequences.
An example of such scenario is shown in Table 3.5. In the reference network, the
attacking source is from Department A and the target is internal FTP server. Instead of
trying 6 passwords one by one, trying 2 passwords for 3 times, separated by PING probing
actions. Suppose there is detection rule suggesting three consecutive attempts will generate
a brute-force attack alert, which is a naive detection method. The obfuscated sequence will
not trigger such alert 1.
Table 3.5: An example scenario of activity splitting obfuscation
Obs. # Clean alert sequence Obfuscated alert sequence
1 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt
2 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt
3 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
4 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
5 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt
6 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt TCP PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
7 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt
8 ET SCAN Potential FTP Brute-Force attempt
Action removal
Action removal is the obfuscation technique where attacker is hiding critical actions that are
indicative of the intrusion state. Table 3.6 is an example containing attack action removal.
The example scenario assumes an experienced insider attacker attacking internal web
server from department C in the reference network. After the target was discovered, the
attacker uses idle scanning [73] from an internal printer, and completely hide the services
1There are different level of intrusion detections. The detection engine mentioned in this example is
NIDS, and the long sequence of brute force password attack can be interrupted by other actions, such as
PING or scanning. On the other hand, it is possible that there are other intrusion detection systems installed
on application level. For example, by inspecting FTP logs, the activity splitting obfuscation will not be
effective anymore, because FTP application will not see and be interrupted by PING actions.
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Table 3.6: An example scenario of action removal obfuscation
Obs. # Clean alert sequence Obfuscated alert sequence
1 PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
2* SCAN nmap XMAS SHELLCODE Metasploit meterpreter connection attempt
3* SCAN nmap TCP
4 SHELLCODE Metasploit meterpreter connection attempt
5* INDICATOR-COMPROMISE c99shell.php command re-
quest - ls
6* INDICATOR-COMPROMISE c99shell.php command re-
quest - ps aux
scanning actions2. The last two actions from the clean alert sequence create backdoor
access to the running processes in the server, and critical to suggest that the target is already
compromised. By carefully choosing encoding or encryption schemes, such alerts can be
hidden from being observed and cause the inaccurate assessment.
An example of obfuscated network attack sequence
To summarize the various obfuscation techniques, we define the network attack as an in-
trusion process that includes malicious probing for information gathering and attack sur-
face exploitation for possible vulnerabilities. An observed network attack is a sequence of
events with uncertainties, including possible missing and misleading observations.
Table 3.7 gives an example of attack sequence and one possible way of obfuscation.
Snort descriptions are used to illustrate the attack progression, in terms of the exploits at-
tempted by the attacker. The observations with an asterisk represent the obfuscated actions.
The attacker began with host discovery and altered the ICMP packet time-to-live field
to hide the signature of the operating system used for reconnaissance. Once the attacker
discovered the Web server, various encoding techniques were used to hide the malicious
signature in the packet payload. Such actions triggered the obfuscation indicator alerts, no-
tifying the analyst that possible obfuscations were detected, but with uncertainty about the
specific actions evaded / obfuscated. Finally, after the attacker successfully compromised
the target with FTP vulnerabilities. More stealthy actions are used to avoid the exposure of
2Idle scanning takes advantage of predictable TCP sequence number vulnerability and can be completely
anonymous when probing target host’s servers.
50
compromise indicator alerts.
Table 3.7: An example of attack sequence obfuscation
Obs. # Clean alert sequence Obfuscated alert sequence
1 PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows
2* PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Oracle Solaris
3* PROTOCOL-ICMP PING Windows PROTOCOL-ICMP PING LINUX/*BSD
4 PROTOCOL-ICMP PING undefined code PROTOCOL-ICMP PING undefined code
5 ICMP PING NMAP ICMP PING NMAP
6* SCAN nmap XMAS
7 SCAN nmap TCP SCAN nmap TCP
8 SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt
9 SHELLCODE Metasploit meterpreter connection attempt SHELLCODE Metasploit meterpreter connection attempt
10* WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt INDICATOR-OBFUSCATION standard ASCII encoded
with UTF-8 possible evasion detected
11* WEB-IIS multiple decode attempt INDICATOR-OBFUSCATION obfuscated portable exe-
cutable - seen in exploit kits
12* WEB-IIS unicode directory traversal attempt INDICATOR-OBFUSCATION base64-encoded data ob-
ject found
13* FTP command overflow attempt INDICATOR-OBFUSCATION standard ASCII encoded
with UTF-8 possible evasion detected
14* FTP EXPLOIT overflow
15* INDICATOR-COMPROMISE c99shell.php command re-
quest - ls
16* INDICATOR-COMPROMISE c99shell.php command re-
quest - ps aux
The obfuscation example described in Table 3.7 can have a profound impact on network
attack situation assessment. In particular, by looking at the clean alert sequence, one can
clearly see the intrusion stages, i.e., from reconnaissance, to exploit the vulnerability on
Web server, FTP server and eventually compromised the target host. On the other hand,
obfuscated alert sequence can lead to a different conclusion, because several alerts are
missing and others are replaced with obfuscation indicator. By looking at the obfuscated
alert sequence, one may conclude it is more likely to be an ad-hoc probing and vulnerability
attempts, e.g., using FastTrack automated attack script [76].
For most alert analysis engines, the key component of analyzing attacks is understand-
ing the casual relationships between attack actions [19]. For example, if an attack exploits
a Windows vulnerability, the prior reconnaissance actions are likely to be some kind of OS
footprinting, assuming no missing observations. The diverse attack behaviors and obfusca-
tions present uncertainties, making the attack process probabilistic instead of deterministic.
Such uncertainties can mislead the alert analysis engines, similar to the examples shown
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above.
3.1.2 Current attack obfuscation countermeasures
The above provides a review of obfuscation techniques could be used to confuse the alert
analysis system. Because of the variation of the system services, e.g., network configu-
rations and NIDS engine, the obfuscation techniques can be effective to certain types of
systems but not other.
Facing the different types of obfuscation techniques, many IDSs and alert analysis en-
gines have developed countermeasures. For example, for detecting code-level obfuscations,
Snort NIDS employs decoders and pre-processors to decode the payload of the packet be-
fore pattern matching was applied. For packet-level obfuscation, there are enhanced rules
to detect the malicious manipulation of the packets. For example, in the early years, XMAS
scan [73] was considered to be a stealthy scan since it constructs an invalid packet and the
OS will usually drop it without logging. In modern NIDSs, these scanning are not stealthy
anymore and such signatures are included into the database.
The battle between attack evasion and attack detection has gone on for many years and
the techniques have grown on both sides. Unfortunately, we want to emphasize that attack
defense is lagging behind because the detection rule enhancements are generally ad-hoc
fixes to specific obfuscation techniques after they are discovered. In this continuous battle,
one missing component is to analyze the effect of obfuscation without knowing the exact
obfuscation technique, by developing an abstraction of the obfuscation techniques: action
alteration, insertion and removal. The next section will present an abstraction of attack
obfuscations and show the benefit of recovering the attack strategy/model of the attacker,
to allow the deployment of preemptive defense mechanisms.
3.2 Probabilistic modeling on attack obfuscations
We consider an attack strategy/model as a probabilistic sequence model, e.g., Markov
model or Hidden Markov Model (HMM) [77], to describe the different possible attack
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actions and captures the casual relationship of attack actions using transition probabilities.
More specifically, an attack sequence is mathematically described as a vector of random
variables and each observation is an instance/sample of the attack model. When obfus-
cated, the attack sequence is modeled by another vector of random variables, where an
obfuscation model represents the obfuscation techniques probabilistically. The joint dis-
tribution is the overall description for the attack sequence that contains possible obfus-
cated observations. Because the clean attack sequence and the obfuscated sequence are
not independent, one needs to jointly treat the attack model and the obfuscation model for
probability inference.
Let Ω ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3, · · · } represents the set of possible attack actions, the attack sequence
is defined as a length-N vector random variable X, where random variable Xk ∈ Ω, k ∈
{1, 2, 3, · · · , N} is defined as the kth observed action in the attack sequence X. An attack
model is a probabilistic sequence model to specify P (X), which is shown in (3.1) as a Lth
order Markov model.
P (X) = P (X1, · · · , XL)
N−L∏
k=1
P (XL+k|XL+k−1, XL+k−2, · · · , Xk) (3.1)
where P (X1, · · · , XL) represents the initial distribution of the Lth order Markov model.
The Markov property (given L observations past and further are independent) enables the
product form decomposition of P (X).
The attack model discussed here does not take the obfuscated observations into account
and it represents the intended attack strategy of the attacker. The term clean attack sequence
is used to represent the sequences directly generated from this attack model. Because of
the Markov property, the attack model has a chain structure [78]. Figure 3.3 shows the
graphical representation of a first order attack model, and the joint distribution of X can be
written in (3.2).





X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Figure 3.3: Graphical model notation for 1st order model
Let a random variable vector Y represents obfuscated attack sequence. Y conditional
dependens on X and the obfuscation model P (Y|X) describes the relationship between
clean and obfuscated sequence probabilistically.
According to the sequence length relationship between clean sequence X and obfus-
cated sequence Y, there are two types of models:
• Type-I model, where the length of X is equal to length of Y.
• Type-II model, where the length of X is larger than or smaller than length of Y.
Type-I model can be used to model attack action alteration obfuscation and Type-II
model can be used for noise insertion and action removal.
3.2.1 Type-I model for action alteration
Action alteration model
For Type-I model, i.e., the clean and noise sequence have same length, one important model
is HMM. HMM is a widely used model to describe sequential observation with noise,
where the hidden random variables represent the clean sequence, and the observations rep-






In HMM, observed event i only directly depends on the corresponding hidden state
i, P (Y|X) for HMM can be written as (3.3). The term P (Yk = y|Xk = x) is called
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X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Y1 Y2 Y3 · · · YN
Figure 3.4: Graphical model notation for HMM
emission probability, which can be described by a discrete function, g(x, y). We define
g(x, y) as obfuscation function/matrix .
Additional constrains can and should be placed on the basic framework of HMM to
reflect attack obfuscation behavior. Specifically, the classical HMM obfuscation model
(3.3) assumes attackers perform obfuscations independently across all attack actions, and
the obfuscation of P (Yk) will directly depend on P (Xk) but have indirect correlations
with other obfuscated actions3. In real-world attack, it almost never happens, and there are
strong correlations between obfuscated actions. Such correlation can be reflected by a more
general obfuscation model P (Y|X) by placing explicit constraints on Y. For example, a
simple extension of (3.3) can be shown in (3.4).
P (Y|X) = 1(
N
M




where I(·) is the indicator function, | · |H represents the Hamming distance between two
vectors.
The added parameter M can be interpreted as an estimate of the percent (M out of N )
of attack actions the attacker may change actions. It serves to complement g(x, y), which
describes the preference on which obfuscation action is more likely to be chosen. The noise
model described in 3.4 is published in [79] and [80].
On the other hand, we also extend the basic HMM structure to finite order on X instead
3The concept of Markov Blanket [78] gives all of the random variables Yk depends on. Here we mean the
connections in graphical notation are only from Yk to Xk.
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of first order. This extension allows us to use a higher order attack model. Recall our attack
sequence modeling work [51] [63] [64] discussed in Chapter 2, cross validation shows the
order is larger than one.
The resulting overall joint attack and obfuscation model can be depicted as a graphical
model shown in Fig. 3.5 with the dashed nodes representing that Yk are not only dependent
on Xk but can also allow only M changes. This simple extension allows assessing the
impact of obfuscation as a function of the percentage of attack actions altered, which will be
shown in Chapter 5. In addition, we will also show the inaccurate estimation of parameter
M have little effect on the attack classification performance.
X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Y1 Y2 Y3 · · · YN
Figure 3.5: An example of proposed Type-I model (second order)
More discussions about action alteration model and HMM
This subsection will discuss more about the rational of the action alteration model proposed
in (3.4). We will focus on two topics: 1. the intuition behind the indicator function design
and 2. the relationship between the classical model, such as HMM.
One simple example will be used for the obfuscation model discussion. Consider there
are 5 possible attack actions: Ω = {A,B,C,D,E}, for any action, there are equal chance
to alter it into other actions. For HMM, the obfuscation matrix P (Yk|Xk) is shown in Table
3.8, where a is a float number and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1. Note that, the parameter a controls how
much obfuscation exists. For example, if a = 0.8, it means 80% of the time, the attacker
will keep the original attack action, and 20% of the time will alter the original attack action
to other actions.
On the other hand, using the proposed action alteration model, the obfuscation matrix
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A B C D E
A a (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4
B (1− a)/4 a (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4
C (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 a (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4
D (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 a (1− a)/4
E (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 (1− a)/4 a
P (Yk|Xk) will be represented in Table 3.9, the key difference is the diagonal elements of
the matrix are always 0.0 and the parameter M in (3.4) will be used to control how much
obfuscation exists. If the diagonal elements of the matrix contain none-zero values, the
conditional probability P (Y|X) is not a valid. (probability definition (P (Y|X) is valid, if
and only if, for any given X,
∑
Y P (Y|X) = 1.0).





A B C D E
A 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
B 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25 0.25
C 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25 0.25
D 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00 0.25
E 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.00
Comparing between two models, the key difference is modeling action alteration im-
plicitly vs. explicitly. HMM model treats no alteration as one type of the obfuscation (the
diagonal elements of the matrix can be none-zero). HMM controls number of alterations in
the whole attack sequence by the obfuscation matrix implicitly. For example, for a length-
N sequence, P (Yk|Xk) given in Table 3.8 will implicitly suggests (1 − a)N number of
alterations. And note that, (1 − a)N is only an expected value, and in reality, number of
alterations is a random number.
On the other hand, for the alteration model proposed in (3.4), we model the action
alteration explicitly and number of alterations can be set into a precise number M (Section
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5 will show the inaccurate estimation of M will not cause big impact for the analysis). The
reason we have such design is that it is necessary to separate attack model with noise model
in security context. The action alteration model proposed also means no alteration is not
a obfuscation activity and should NOT be captured in P (Yk|Xk). Instead, such behavior
should be captured by P (X).
The proposed design is more realistic for security applications, where it may possible
to learn classical clean attack patterns and classical obfuscation techniques from data, sep-
arately. But it is more difficult to learn both of attack model and obfuscation model at
same time. Further, suppose the network analysts want to use domain knowledge to derive
the obfuscation model, it is relative easy to ask the analysts how Table 3.9 should be con-
structed and how much noise actions approximately exists. However, on the other hand, it
is more difficult to construct Table 3.8 to reflect obfuscation level implicitly.
3.2.2 Type-II model for action insertion and action removal
For Type-II model, X and Y have different length. For action insertion, the length of Y
is larger than X and for action removal action insertion, the length of Y is smaller than
X. Similar to Type-I model, there should be a parameter suggestion how much obfuscation
exists. Because the Type-II model have different length on X and Y, how much obfuscation
exists will be directly reflected in model structure. In our work ,we use regularized structure
as an example to show the inference design. The model structure can be easily changed and
we have more discussions the end of this subsection.
Action insertion
Figure 3.6 is an example of action insertion model, where we assume for every one clean
action, additional obfuscated action can be injected. And the length of Y is twice times of
the length of X. For given noisy observation, it conditionally depends on previous action
and one clean attack action.
For the model proposed in Fig. 3.6, the join distribution is shown in (3.5) and the
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X1 X2 · · · XN/2
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 · · · · · · YN−1 YN
Figure 3.6: Graphical representation for action insertion






P (Y1|X1)P (Y2|Y1, X1) N/2∏
i=2
P (Y2i−1|Y2i−2, Xi)P (Y2i|Y2i−1, Xi)

= P (X)P (Y|X) (3.5)
P (Y|X) = P (Y1|X1)P (Y2|Y1, X1)
N/2∏
i=2
P (Y2i−1|Y2i−2, Xi)P (Y2i|Y2i−1, Xi) (3.6)
Action removal
Similarly, for action removal case, if we assume one of two actions can be removed, the
model structure is shown in Fig. 3.7. The joint distribution and obfuscation model can be







)P (Y1|X1, X2) N/2∏
i=2
P (Yi|Yi−1, X2i−1, X2i)

= P (X)P (Y|X) (3.7)
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X1 X2 X3 X4 · · · · · · XN−1 XN
Y1 Y2 · · · YN/2
Figure 3.7: Graphical representation for action removal
P (Y|X) = P (Y1|X1, X2)
N/2∏
i=2
P (Yi|Yi−1, X2i−1, X2i) (3.8)
Discussions on model structure
We want to argue that the model structure proposed in our work are general examples to
model the attack with obfuscations, but not advocating the proposed models are only the
models for specific cases. Security analysts can make changes to the model structure to
reflect more customized obfuscation scenarios.
For example, for Type-II model, the action insertion case, one may argue that the in-
jected noise is conditionally independent of any variable, i.e., the attack randomly injects
noise and there are no links between the injected noise and the true observations, as shown
in Fig. 3.8.
X1 X2 · · · XN/2
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 · · · · · · YN−1 YN
Figure 3.8: Graphical representation of action insertion model 1
In addition, another example of modifying the structure is adding links to the random
variable. For Type-I model, the attack action alteration case, one may argue that the clean
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sequence and noise sequence model are auto-regressive HMM [81] as shown in Fig. 3.9.
In such a case, noise action Yi depends on the previous noise action Yi−1.
X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Y1 Y2 Y3 · · · YN
Figure 3.9: An example of adding dependencies on Type-I model
Finally, for Type-II model (shown in Fig. 3.10), it is possible to be extended with a
higher order on X and additional constrains on Y, similar to the Type-I model shown in
Fig. 3.5, where clean sequence has a second order model and Y is constrained in certain
subset of all possible actions.
X1 X2 · · · XN/2
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 · · · · · · YN−1 YN
Figure 3.10: An example of adding dependencies and constrains on Type-II model
The model structure can be extended to incorporate aforementioned features from our
proposed framework. For example, removing dependencies can be achieved by setting a
special parameter of the the general model. Consider a toy example shown in Fig. 3.11. In
such structure, assume all random variables are binary, P (Z|X, Y ) is a 2× 2× 2 table. We
can use a two dimensional table shown in Table 3.10 to represent such a three dimensional
table, where 0 ≥ a, b, c, d ≥ 1.




Figure 3.11: An toy example of dependency link removal
Table 3.10: An example of parameter set up for link removal toy example
Row Column 1 Column 2
1 P (Z = 0|X = 0, Y = 0) = a P (Z = 1|X = 0, Y = 0) = 1− a
2 P (Z = 0|X = 0, Y = 1) = b P (Z = 1|X = 0, Y = 1) = 1− b
3 P (Z = 0|X = 1, Y = 0) = c P (Z = 1|X = 1, Y = 0) = 1− c
4 P (Z = 0|X = 1, Y = 1) = d P (Z = 1|X = 1, Y = 1) = 1− d
depends on X , we can set rows 1 and 2, row 3 and 4 are exactly the same, respectively,
i.e., a = b, c = d; If we want Z only depends on Y , setting a = c, b = d will satisfy the
needs. This example shows how the conditional distribution table can be changed to reflect
the link removal in the model.
Adding dependencies and constrains are more complicated than removing dependen-
cies. Nevertheless, Chapter 6 will discuss how proposed design can perform probabilistic
inference for most extensions efficiently.
3.3 Probabilistic inference and impact assessment for ob-
fuscated sequences
Different types of models proposed in Section 3.2 enable us to make the impact assessment
for different obfuscation techniques. One of the most important tasks for security analysis
is attack plan recognition [19], which is correlating the observed sequence to one of the
pre-defined attack models. Such correlation would help security analysts to understand the
attack and eventually to predict next possible actions. Correlating observed attack action
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sequence to attack models is a sequence classification problem4 [82] [83]. We first discuss
about matching a clean attack sequence X to pre-defined models. The problem can be
described as finding most possible C for given X, which is arg maxC P (C|X). The attack
models which specify P (X|C), and the prior of the attack model P (C) are given. Using the
Bayes theorem, the classification can be described in (3.9) which is the classical Bayesian










P (X|C)P (C) (3.9)
In order to perform such classification, P (X|C) and P (C) need to be known. P (C)
will be given from domain knowledge. On the other hand, P (X|C) can be calculated
from attack model. Knowing P (X|C) and P (C) enables us to calculate the conditional
probability P (C|X) and eventually classify the observed sequence in to predefined attack
model using Bayesian classification as shown in (3.9).
So far, the attack classification discussed assumes the observed sequences X are gen-
erated by pre-defined attack models and do not contain any noise. To evaluate the impact
caused by attack obfuscations, it is necessary to understand the performance limit of the
classification when attacks contain obfuscation. Therefore, we need to finding the repre-
sentative metric for impact assessment with possible obfuscated observations.
The metric we used is expected classification accuracy, which have close relationship
with many concepts in statistics literature, such as irreducible error or Bayes error rate
[37]. This metric means that, assume the true distribution are known and we have the
perfect model to captures the true distribution of the data, there may still be errors when
making classification, because the true distribution of the different classes may overlap.
4In general, there are different types of the correlation engine, the correlation discussed in following
sections are computational approaches and rule based correlation are not included.
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The term irreducible error or Bayes error rate will describe how much the overlap is, and
the metric we used is 1−Bayes error.
An example is given here to introduce the performance metric on clean sequence and
noise sequence. Figure 3.12 gives an example of sequence classification and performance
limit of the classification. Using the two attack model specified in Chapter 5, 200 length-
20 attack sequences are generated for each attack model. The prior distribution P (C) is
uniform on two attach models. For each sequence, the Log-likelihood for each of the two
models are calculated. All the sequences are plotted as a data point in Fig. 3.12, where
x-axis and y-axis are the likelihood for model 0 and model 1 respectively. Because of the
generative model is known and the prior is equal for two classes, (3.9) tells us the optimal
classification is comparing two likelihoods which is shown as the optimal classifier is the
diagonal line.
Figure 3.12: An example of attack sequence classification by comparing the likelihood
As shown in Fig. 3.12, it is easy to classify the given data points (classification can be
done by comparing the likelihood), but it is not clear to state how separable the data is, i.e.,
what is the limit that the classifier can do. The metric of expected classification accuracy
64






Equation (3.10) can be explained as follows: for any given obfuscated observation Y,
P (C|Y ) can be calculated for all attack models, and the noise sequence Y can be clas-
sified into pre-defined models by using arg maxC P (C|Y). By doing such classification,
maxC P (C|Y) percent of all time, the classification will be correct. Summing over all
possible Y will give us the mathematical expectation of the classification accuracy.
In sum, the problem addressed in our framework can be described as how to calculate
the performance limit for obfuscated attack observations for different obfuscation strategy
P (X|Y), i.e., calculating
∑
Y P (Y) maxC P (C|Y), given P (X|C), P (C), and P (Y|X).
As shown in Chapter 4, the calculation, i.e., probabilistic inference, is computational chal-
lenging, especially for certain obfuscation strategies, algorithms need to be derived to in-
ference effectively.
Using proposed framework and algorithm, the network analysts would be able to calcu-
late the noise sequence distribution. Figure 3.13 is one example of our published simulation
results [79], P (Y) is shown in Fig. 3.13(b), form the figure we can roughly observe how
much impact caused by given obfuscation strategy: only 10% of obfuscated events cause a
lot of overlap for two group of points. More importantly, the performance limit shown in
(3.10) can be calculated as a benchmark to access specific scenarios.
Table 3.11 summarizes the notations used in our framework and will be heavily used in
next chapter’s algorithm design.
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(a) Attack sequences without noise (b) Attack sequences with noise
Figure 3.13: Comparison of classify attack sequence with/without noise
Table 3.11: Notations used in algorithm design
Notation Explanation
Ω a set of possible attack actions
X a vector of random variable represents observed actions
Xk k
th action in vector X
C a random variable represents attack model classes
fC(·) a function describes for attack model C
N a integer, represents the length of the observation
Y a vector of r.v. represents noisy observation




This chapter will discuss the algorithm design for performing probabilistic inference on
proposed Type-I and Type-II models. We first introduce the concept of probabilistic infer-
ence and computational challenges, then present basic ideas of inference for probabilistic
graphical model by two simplified problems. Utilizing the ideas illustrated in simplified
problems, theorems and and algorithms are derived to inference on the proposed models
that reflect attack sequence obfuscations. Finally, the algorithm of evaluating the impact of
attack obfuscation is discussed.
According to the problem statement in the last part of Chapter 3 (subsection 3.3), the
metric we used to evaluate the expected classification accuracy for obfuscated attack se-






















P (Y|C)P (C) (4.2)
The probability of clean observation sequence for given attack model P (X|C), the
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prior of attack models P (C) and the noise model P (Y|X) 1 are assumed to be known. To
calculate
∑
Y maxC P (Y|C)P (C), two sub-problems need to be solved:
• Given P (X|C) and P (Y|X), calculate P (Y|C).
• Given P (Y|C), calculate
∑
Y maxC P (Y|C)P (C).
The first subproblem is can be solved by an extension of Message Passing Algorithm
[78] using dynamic programming idea, and the second subproblem can be approximated
by Monte-Carlo approximation with any desired precision and confidence.
4.1 Probabilistic inference algorithm design
4.1.1 Basic probabilistic inference problem
Probabilistic inference is the problem of calculating specific marginal or conditional dis-
tributions for given model [78]. The inference is computationally challenging because
brute-force calculation needs to take account for the exponential number of terms. For
example, let X to be a length-N vector of random variables. Calculate the marginal dis-
tribution P (X1) needs to sum over X2, X3, · · · , XN , which is looping over ΩN−1 terms,
where Xi ∈ Ω.
Performing exact inference for arbitrary model structure of P (X) is a NP-hard problem
[81]. However, for some special structure of P (X) (for example we will discuss the chain
structure later), efficient algorithm exists.
In HMM literature, there are classical algorithms to perform exact inference. For ex-
ample, the well-known Viterbi algorithm [77] enables one to efficiently calculate the most




1For different types of attack obfuscations, e.g., Type-I and Type-II model, P (Y|X) is different from one
to another.
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Likewise, one can efficiently calculate P (Y) for HMM, because P (Y|X) is relatively
simple for HMM, comparing the to obfuscation model proposed in Chapter 3.
Unfortunately, some of the existing algorithms cannot be directly applied to the Type-I
and Type-II model proposed in Chapter 3. For Type-I model, constraint M on Y will affect
the possible values of X and the arg max operation will only apply to a subset of X that
satisfies the constraint. For Type-II model, the length of X and Y are different.
Here we discuss two simplified problems to show the idea of solving the inference
problem in our proposed model. After discussing the simplified problem, the algorithm
design for different model stricture and possible extensions are given.
Inference on a chain structure
One example of inference on a chain structure is explained as follows: suppose we want to






We can represent the relationship for all the variables with a chain structure shown in
Fig. 4.1, where Xi only interact with Xi−1 and Xi+1. This simplified problem comes
from the first order Markov model described in 2, because the joint distribution of first or-
der Markov model have the term
∏N−1
i=1 P (Xi+1|Xi) and according to Markovian property
given Xi, Xi−1 and Xi+1 are independent.
X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Figure 4.1: An example of chain structure
Because the objective function has such a special chain structure, we can take advantage
of this structure, and use dynamic programming techniques to solve the optimization.
2In the beginning of this Chapter, inference example is given by summation operation, and in this example
it is given by maximization operation. In fact, they are eventually the same from algorithm design perspective








s.t. Xi = a
The function 3 defines Fi(a) as the cost of the best length-i subsequence and end with
symbol a. For the chain structure, the only connections between subsequence X1 to Xi
and subsequence Xi to XN is the variable Xi. The reason we set the constrain of the
subsequence ends with symbol a is because we want to decouple the interactions between
two subsequences. Such constrain will allow us to solve the problem in a smaller scale, and
drive recursion rules for extension, which is the idea of dynamic programming. By define
the function Fi(a) we can prove the recursion rule described Theorem 4.1.1.
Theorem 4.1.1. Let Fi(a) be the cost of the best length-i subsequence and end with symbol
a as shown in (4.5). Equation (4.6) gives the relationship between Fi(a) and Fi−1(a), that
can be used in Algorithm 1 to find the optimal solution for (4.4).
Fi(a) = max
b
Fi−1(b) · f(b, a) (4.6)
3Fi(a) is a discrete function of a for give i. Because it is a discrete function, it can be stored in one
dimensional a table / array. In addition, Fi(a) can also be viewed as a two dimensional table for different
i. These tables are also called dynamic programming table. In this work, the term dynamic programming



























s.t. Xi = a
= Fi(a)
Using Theorem 4.1.1, the algorithm to solve the optimization is given in Algorithm
1. The complexity is Θ(N · |Ω|2), where N is the length of the sequence, and |Ω| is the
number of the possible values of the random variables, i.e., Xi ∈ Ω. As discussed earlier,
the brute-force calculation for searching the max value will consider |ΩN | number of terms.
Inference with constrains
As discussed earlier, Type-I model has the additional constrain on Y. In the second exam-
ple, we add constraint to the chain structure to illustrate the algorithm design.
The revised problem is shown in (4.7). The major difference is that only a subset of X
needs to be considered. The subset of X is depend on M and Y, i.e., only M number of






We represent the chain structure with constrain in Fig. 4.2, the dashed variables repre-
sent additional constraints are applied.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm to solve the inference on a chain structure





for a ∈ Ω do




// Run dynamic programming according to recursion rule
for i ∈ 3, 4, · · · , N do
for a ∈ Ω do
Fi(a) = max
b






X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Figure 4.2: An example of chain structure with constrain
Comparing to the solution without additional constraint, one can add another dimension
to the dynamic programming table to decompose the dependencies on constrain. We define







s.t. Xi = a
| < X1, · · ·Xi > − < Y1, · · ·Yi > |H = j
Theorem 4.1.2 gives the recursion rules on defined function in (4.8).
Theorem 4.1.2. Let Fi,j(a) be the sum for (4.7) and sum over the subsequenceX1, · · · , Xi.
In addition, the subsequence X1, · · · , Xi is different from Y1, · · · , Yi by j. Further, Xi = a







Fi−1,j(b) · f(b, a) if a = Yi
∑
b
Fi−1,j−1(b) · f(b, a) if a 6= Yi
(4.9)
The proof of Theorem 4.1.2 case a = Yi is given. Using similar idea, it is easy to show
the recursion rules for a 6= Yi case.
Proof. Case 1, a = Yi∑
b









 · f(b, a)
s.t. Xi−1 = b






f(Xk, Xk+1) · f(Xi−1, a)
s.t. Xi = a
a = Yi







s.t. Xi = a
a = Yi
|(X1, X2, · · · , Xi−1, Yi)− (Y1, Y2, · · · , Yi−1, Yi)|H = j
=Fi,j(a)
Using the recursion rules shown in Theorem 4.1.2, the algorithm can be derived to
efficiently inference with the constraints.
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We further illustrate the intuition behind the algorithm by showing an example of the
dynamic programming table in Fig. 4.3. The intuition of designing dynamic programming
table entry Fi,j(a) is taking advantage of the chain structure by defining a variable a, and
solve the problem in smaller scale. In addition, another dimension gives the decomposition
for the constrain: j element difference from Y. FN,M can be calculated from bottom up by
the recursion rule and P (Y) =
∑
a(FN,M(a)) is the solution for the original problem.
In general, every entry in the dynamic programming table can be calculated by its
left neighbor entry or upper left neighbor entry, i.e., Fi,j can be calculated from Fi−1,j
or Fi−1,j−1 as shown in theorem. The entries in the first row and diagonal of the table have
special recursion rules to calculate from its left neighbor entry and upper left neighbor entry
respectively.
Figure 4.3: An example of 8× 5 dynamic programming table
The complexity of the algorithm is Θ(N · M · |Ω|2), where N is the length of the
sequence, M is the total number of elements the are different between X and Y. The com-
plexity can be intuitively explained as follows: the dimension of the dynamic programming
table is N ×M . For every entry, it stores a function of a. The calculation for an entry re-
quires looping over the Ω space. In addition, evaluating the function needs to sum over the
variable b as shown in (4.9), which needs another loop over Ω.
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4.1.2 Inference for different obfuscation models
After discussing inference on a chain structure and inference with additional constraint,
the recursion rule and algorithm can be easily derived using the idea for the attack model
and obfuscation model proposed in Chapter 3. In this subsection we give the algorithm
of calculating obfuscated sequence distribution for Type-I and Type-II model. For a better
notation, we drop the random variable C in P (Y|C), which means we focus on specific
attack model and obfuscation model and they are already given. In next subsection, the
impact assessment for different C will be discussed.
Type-I model for action alteration
For Type-I model, P (X) is finite order Markov model, and P (Y|X) is given in (4.10).
P (Y|X) = 1(
N
M




Let f(x, y) = P (Xi+1 = y|Xi = x), g(x, y) = P (Yi = y|Xi = x), the noise sequence









P (X1, X2, · · · , XL)
N−L∏
k=1







The dynamic programing function Fi,j(A) is defined in 4.12, where the length of vector





P (X1, X2, · · · , XL)
i−L∏
k=1






s.t. < Xi−L+1, · · · , Xi >= A
| < X1, · · · , Xi > − < Y1, · · · , Yi > |H = j (4.12)
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Given the function definition, the recursion rules are shown in (4.13). The proof is










′ >) · f(< B,A >)g(AL, Yi), if AL 6= Yi
(4.13)
Type-II model for action insertion and removal






P (Y1|X1)P (Y2|Y1, X1) N/2∏
i=2
P (Y2i−1|Y2i−2, Xi)P (Y2i|Y2i−1, Xi)









P (Y1|X1)P (Y2|Y1, X1) N/2∏
i=2
P (Y2i−1|Y2i−2, Xi)P (Y2i|Y2i−1, Xi)

Let f(x, y) = P (Xi+1 = y|Xi = x), g(x, y, z) = P (Y2i−1 = z|Y2i−2 = x,Xi = y),
φ(x, y, z) = P (Y2i = z|Y2i−1 = x,Xi = y). The dynamic programming function can be
defined in (4.14).
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Algorithm 2: Inference algorithm to calculate P (Y)
Data: Length-N sequence Y, Lth order Markov model, function g(x, y) and noise level M
Result: Noise sequence distribution P (Y)
Initialize DP Table;
for i ∈ 3, 4, · · · , N do
for j ∈ 1, 2, 3, · · · ,min(M, i) do
if j = 1 // Calculate first row in table
then
for A ∈ ΩL do





′ >)f(< B,A >)
end
else
Fi,j(A) =P (X1, X2, · · · , XL)
i−1−L∏
k=1




else if i = j // Calculate diagonal elements
then
for A ∈ ΩL do










for A ∈ ΩL do





′ >)f(< B,A >)
end
else























P (Y1|X1)P (Y2|Y1, X1)g(Y2k−2, Xk, Y2k−1)φ(Y2k−1, Xk, Y2k)
s.t. Xi = a (4.14)





Fi−1(b) · f(b, a) · g(Y2i−2, a, Y2i−1) · φ(Y2i−1, a, Y2i) (4.15)
Given the recursion rule (4.15), the algorithm can be easily derived, similar to the sim-
plified problem discussed before. To avoid the repetition, we ignore the algorithm imple-
mentation for Type-II model.







)P (Y1|X1, X2) N/2∏
i=2
P (Yi|Yi−1, X2i−1, X2i)

= P (X)P (Y|X)







P (Yi|Yi−1, X2i−1, X2i)

Let f(x, y) = P (Xi+1 = y|Xi = x), g(x, y, z, p) = P (Yi = p|Yi−1 = x,X2i−1 =
y,X2i = z). Then we expand and re-write the product operation. The goal is make the
product subscript the same, so we can define the dynamic programming function.
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The dynamic programming function can be defined in (4.16).







g(Yk−1, X2k−1, X2k, Yk)
s.t. X2i = a




Fi−1(b) · f(b, c) · f(c, a) · g(Yi−1, c, a, Yi) (4.17)
Other structures with additional dependencies
As discussed in Chapter 3, the model structure can be extended by multiple ways. Chapter
3 already illustrated how to remove dependencies between random variables. In this sub-
section, we discuss how to extend the model structure by adding additional dependencies
on random variables and the corresponding algorithm design (inference recursion rules).
Consider the joint distribution of X and Y, there are three ways of adding links:
• Adding dependences on clean sequence X
• Adding dependences on noise sequence Y
• Adding interactive dependences between X and Y
The first case is already addressed by Type-I model, which describe a Lth order Markov
model on P (X). This subsection will give the solutions for the other two cases. Adding
the dependencies on Y and between X and Y can be viewed adding another term on the
recursion rule. Here, we use two examples to illustrate how to make the modification, the
repetitive proofs are not listed.
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X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Y1 Y2 Y3 · · · YN
Figure 4.4: An example of adding dependencies on Y

































And we can easy prove the recursion rule shown in (4.19), where f(x, y) = P (Xi+1 =




Fi−1(b) · f(b, a) · g(a, Yi) · φ(Yi−1, Yi) (4.19)
On the other hand, another example of adding dependencies on the interactions between
X and Y is shown in Fig.4.5,
X1 X2 X3 · · · XN
Y1 Y2 Y3 · · · YN
















= P (X)P (Y|X)


















The recursion rule for the model shown in Fig. 4.5 is listed in (4.21), where f(x, y) =




Fi−1(b) · f(b, a) · g(a, Yi) · ψ(Xi−1, Yi) (4.21)
4.2 Performance evaluation for sequence classification
This section discusses the second subproblem: how to compute the expected classification
accuracy for noise sequence Y, i.e., how to evaluate (4.2), where P (Y|C) can be calculated
with Algorithm 2 and P (C) is known.
The notation of (4.2) is simple, but calculating the expectation needs to sum over expo-
nential number of terms, respect the observation length-N , similar as before, the reason is
that the possible values for vector Y is |Ω|N .
Similar to the problem of calculating P (Y|C) addressed before, calculating the ex-
pected classification accuracy in (4.2) also need to sum over exponential number of terms.
However, unlike solving the problem of P (Y|C), to the best of our knowledge, there is no
efficient algorithm to solve 4.2 efficiently.
There are two major reasons. First, P (Y|C) is calculated from P (X|C) and P (Y|X),
as discussed earlier, there are analytical expression for P (X|C) and P (Y|X). In addition,
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they satisfy the element by element basis property which can be decoupled by dynamic
programing idea.
On the other hand, for calculating the expected classification accuracy from P (Y|C),
we do not have the analytical expression for P (Y|C), instead, for any given Y, we need to
execute dynamic programming in Algorithm 2 to get the value. So we will not be able to
use the similar idea to solve it efficiently. Second, max operation makes the problem more
complicated and eventually prohibit us to decouple the problem to element by element
basis.
Although it is difficult to calculate the exact value of expected classification accuracy
described equation 4.2, we can efficiently approximate it with arbitrary precision and con-
fidence using Monte-Carlo method.
The reason is that we can easily get samples of Y from the distribution P (Y). With









where Yk are independent and identically distributed random variables sampled from










P (Y|C)P (C) (4.23)
P (C|Y) is a probability value, according to the definition of ψ(Y), 0 ≤ ψ(Y) ≤ 1.









where n is number of samples and δ , 2 exp(−2nε2).








Then, with probability at least 1− δ, the difference between the approximation and the
true value is at most ε.
The values for ε = 0.01 and δ = 0.01 need at least 26, 492 samples. In the experiments,
we use 30,000 samples. The approximation algorithm is given in 3.
Algorithm 3: Algorithm to estimate the expected classification accuracy
Input: Given P (X|C), P (C), P (X|Y), sample size n
Output: expected classification accuracy for sequence classification
Set S =<>
for i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , n} do
Sample C0 from P (C)
Given sample C0, sample X0 from P (X|C0)
Given sample X0, sample Y0 from P (Y|X0)
Set V =<>
for c ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |C|} do
Given Y0, calculate P (Y0|c) using Algorithm 2
Append V with P (Y0|c)P (c)
end
Append S with max(V)/sum(V)
end
return max(S)/sum(S)
4.3 Algorithm efficiency verification
The last section of the chapter will verify the effectiveness of Monte-Carlo approximation
and dynamic programming algorithm we proposed.
For a small observation length N , it is possible to calculate the exact expected clas-
sification accuracy by summing over all X using (4.1). We did the exact calculation for
observation length from 5 to 10. On the other hand, we approximate the expected classi-
fication accuracy with different observation length by using proposed algorithm. For each
given observation length, 10 repetitions of approximation experiments are conducted. For
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each repetition, the 30, 000 samples are used. As discussed earlier, the ε and δ should be
smaller than 0.01.




















Figure 4.6: Monte Carlo approximation accuracy
Figure 4.6 shows the box plot of differences between exact value and approximation
on 10 repetitions. From the box plot we can observe that the estimation is even better
than theoretical bounds. The theoretical bounds tell us the error should be smaller than
0.01 with probability 99%. The experiments of 10 repetitions show 0.003 max error for
different observation length. In fact, Hoeffeding bound usually is a loose bound, if we take
number of samples calculated from Hoeffeding bound, the result is usually better than the
theoretical value.
Figure 4.6 tells us the approximation is accurate. Figure 4.7, gives the time cost com-
parison between approximation and exact calculation. The time cost of approximation and
exact calculation of expected classification accuracy plotted in log-scale in Fig. 4.7. The
exact calculation time cost increases exponentially respect to observation length N . This
is because the summation needs to be conducted over all possible X, and number all pos-
sible X is |Ω|N . On the other hand, the time cost for approximation is almost the same
for different observation length. The reason is that no matter how many possible values
X can take, we only take fixed number of samples to estimate the expected classifica-
tion accuracy, 30,000 in our case. For example, for N = 10, all possible values for X
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Figure 4.7: Monte Carlo approximation time saving
is |Ω|N = 610 = 60, 466, 176, we still can use 30, 000 samples to estimate the expected
classification accuracy with the same accuracy.
To verify the noise inference algorithm proposed, we use brute-force algorithm to cal-
culate P (Y = Y0) by summing over all the X that satisfy the constrain. The brute force
algorithm has three steps. First, we produce all X that satisfy the constrain |X−Y0|H = M .
Then, calculate P (X)P (Y0|X). Finally, we sum over the values for each X. In compar-
ison, we use dynamic programming to calculate P (Y = Y0). We will get the exact same
answers by these two approaches but with different time cost.
Figure 4.8 shows the time cost for brute force inference for different N , M and |Ω|.
In particular, the values are fixed, so that the time cost with brute force can be within a
reasonable range.





(|Ω| − 1)M number of terms, From
Fig. 4.8, we know the time increases rapidly respect to N and M . For sub figure 2, M has





. We observe when M in the middle of N , the system
is very useful. And in security this is the case, of we observe N we would not have the
noise is close to N or a small number.
With the same setup, the time costs for Algorithm 2 are around 0.01 second. Therefore
we set the values to a much bigger scale to test the performance of dynamic programming
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Figure 4.8: Brute force time cost for calculating P (Y|C)
Figure 4.9: Proposed algorithm time cost for calculating P (Y|C)
time cost. Even the problem scale is much larger, the algorithm still gets the results in few
seconds. This is important because in real security application, the observation window
should contain hundreds of events, and the number of possible noise elements should also
be a big number. But the size of |Ω| should not be too big because of Bias-Variance trade
off [37]. Finally, as discussed earlier, the complexity of the algorithm is Θ(N ·M · |Ω|2). In
the experiments, we do observe these trends. In particular, the time cost increase linearly
respect to N and M . For a reasonable |Ω| (around 10) the time cost for proposed algorithm
is less than 1.0 second.
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Chapter 5
Network attack obfuscation simulation
and results
5.1 Simulation framework and set up
5.1.1 Attack action space
In general, one can model network attacks at various levels with a combination of attributes
reported by NIDS and host logs. To demonstrate the use of the proposed framework, this
paper considers 15 classical and widely used attack actions from five categories selected
from MITRE’s common attack pattern enumeration and classification [71]. The attack
categories and action space Ω are shown in Fig. 5.1.
The five categories (C-0 to C-4) show different levels (stages) of the intrusion process.
Abuse of functionality is a low-profile information-gathering step; taking advantage of the
function provided by the target system can achieve a certain level of information collection
without leaving much malicious trace, because such functions are designed to serve normal
requests. For example, instead of scanning the target web server to get the server version,
one can try to access a non-existing web page and observe the HTTP-404-ERROR gener-
ated by the server, which can expose the server platform and version. Network reconnais-
sance is a category of high-profile scanning in addition to abuse of functionality. Actions
in this category are essentially taking advantage of the TCP/IP protocol, e.g., TRACER-
OUTE, PING, NMAP etc., to explore unknown environment. Probabilistic techniques rep-
resent another type of exploration, using a number or trials to identify vulnerabilities. For
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• Abuse of functionality (C-0)
– Detect unpublicised web pages and services (A-0-1)
– Directory traversal (A-0-2)
– Web server application fingerprinting (A-0-3)
• Network reconnaissance (C-1)
– Infrastructure-based footprinting (A-1-1)
– Host discovery (A-1-2)
– Scanning for vulnerable software (A-1-3)
• Probabilistic techniques (C-2)
– Fuzzing (A-2-1)
– Screen temporary files for information (A-2-2)
– Client-server protocol manipulation (A-2-3)
– Dictionary-based password attack (A-2-4)
• Buffer overflow and code injection (C-3)
– Manipulating user-controlled variables (A-3-1)
– Command or script injection (A-3-2)
– Hijacking a privileged process or thread (A-3-3)
• Data leakage attacks (C-4)
– Data excavation attacks (A-4-1)
– Data interception / sniffer attacks (A-4-2)
Figure 5.1: An example of action space (attack patterns)
example, fuzzing is widely used in software testing by feeding the system with invalid,
unexpected random inputs. By observing the system feedback, an experienced attacker
can discover possible design flaws, including the chance of getting buffer overflow or code
injection vulnerability, which is part of category C-3 and can eventually compromise the
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target machine. After compromising the target the ultimate goal of attack can be stealing
sensitive data or data excavation, e.g., generic cross-browser cross-domain thefts [71], or
data interception/sniffer.
5.1.2 Attack models
Four attack models are defined based on the attack action space shown in Fig. 5.1. Two of
them are first order and the other two are second order1. The two first order attack models
are shown in Tables 5.1 and 5.2; only non-zero rows are listed. These two models are
inspired from real attacks in ICTF hacking competition data set [61] [43] and CAIDA data
set [65] [62]. The (i, j) element in the table denotes the transition probability P (Xi+1 =
j|Xi = i).
The strategy described in Table 5.1 can be explained as a two phases attack: reconnais-
sance and intrusion phase. The attacker is more hesitant to switch between phases than stay
within a phase. The specific probability numbers in the table can reflect the characteristics
of the attack, e.g., the automatic script the attacker is using. In fact, our experience sug-
gests that the probabilities of action transitions are quite reliable for detecting the attack
tools such as Metasploit [76] or Nessus [85]. The model shown in Table 5.2 reflects a dif-
ferent attack strategy: the attacker utilizes the reconnaissance actions throughout the attack
process, and perform specific exploits only sporadically.
Table 5.3 shows Model-3, the first of the two second order attack models used for
the experiments. Every row in the Table 5.3 represents a combination of two past actions,
Xi−1, Xi. There are a total of |Ω|3 number of parameters in the model and most parameters
are zero. Table 5.3 only shows a fraction of the non-zero parameters. The design of Model-
3 is describing attack behavior more specific. As an example, the first row indicates that the
attacker is doing host scanning to discover live hosts and live services. This usually takes a
long time in order to obtain sufficient information. Therefore, the attacker may keep doing
1As pointed out by Fava et al. [35] and Du et al. [51], most attack behaviors can be captured with first and
second order Markov models. Furthermore, higher order models can be too specific with high complexity
and perform poorly because of Bias-variance trade-off [37].
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Table 5.1: Attack model 1 (partial) used in simulation
A-0-1 A-1-2 A-2-1 A-3-1 A-4-2
A-0-1 0.30 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-1-2 0.30 0.20 0.30 0.10 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-2-1 0.20 0.25 0.40 0.10 0.05
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-3-1 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.30
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-4-2 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.60
Table 5.2: Attack model 2 (partial) used in simulation
A-0-1 A-1-2 A-2-1 A-3-1 A-4-2
A-0-1 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.05 0.05
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-1-2 0.40 0.30 0.20 0.05 0.05
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-2-1 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.15 0.15
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-3-1 0.20 0.20 0.30 0.20 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-4-2 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
A-0-1 following previous two A-0-1. In reality, it is very likely to observe a long sequence
of A-0-1. The second of the two second order model, Model-4, reflects similar behavior on
the high-profile phase but much more specific on describing the long sequence of certain
vulnerability attempts.
5.1.3 Obfuscation models
Both Type-I and Type-II obfuscation models discussed in Chapter 3 are used in the simula-
tion. Table 5.4 shows a subset of the function g(x, y) for action alteration, which defines the
obfuscation behavior and will be used for the subsequent action alteration simulations. The
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Table 5.3: Attack model 3 (partial) used in simulation
A-0-1 A-1-2 A-2-1 A-3-1 A-4-2
A-0-1,A-0-1 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
A-0-1,A-1-2 0.35 0.66 0.03 0.03 0.03
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-3-1,A-0-1 0.30 0.10 0.10 0.40 0.10
A-3-1,A-1-2 0.10 0.30 0.10 0.40 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
(i, j)th element gives the value of g(x = i, y = j). This function reflects that the obfus-
cation behavior will mostly alter attack actions within the same category, but occasionally
change from one to another category.




A-0-1 A-1-2 A-2-1 A-3-1 A-4-2
A-0-1 0.00 0.40 0.40 0.10 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-1-2 0.40 0.00 0.40 0.10 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-2-1 0.40 0.40 0.00 0.10 0.10
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-3-1 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.00 0.50
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
A-4-2 0.10 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.00
5.1.4 Simulation overview
The simulation overview is shown in Fig. 5.2. From the security domain knowledge,
we have multiple attack models. These models are in different orders and have different
parameters. The attack sequences are generated from these attack models. After attack
sequence generation, the mixed attack sequences will be feed into different attack obfus-
cation techniques discussed in Chapter 3. The sequence classifiers for clean sequence and
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noise sequence assume the full knowledge of the attack model but not attack obfuscation
model. They compare the likelihood for a given observed sequence cross different genera-
tive models to perform classification. On the other hand, noise inference algorithm utilize
the knowledge of attack obfuscation module (as shown in Section 5.2.3, inaccurate es-
timation of the attack obfuscation can also be acceptable) to calculate the distribution of
the obfuscated sequence eventually to make the sequence classifier better. We will compare
the classification results for clean attack sequence, noise attack sequence and using the pro-
posed inference algorithm. The performance metric is defined as the optimal classification
rate which is specified in (4.1).
Figure 5.2: Simulation overview for attack sequence classification with obfuscations
5.2 Type-I model simulation and results
5.2.1 A case study of action alteration obfuscation
In this section, a case study of obfuscated multistage attack is studied to show how the
algorithm proposed in this paper can help security analysts to understand the obfuscated
attack sequence better. Figure 5.3 gives the network diagram used for the case study. It
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describes a small enterprise network with six subnets, eleven servers and four clusters of
hosts (24 hosts in total). The whole network has 31 open services (15 types total) and
interconnected via four routers.
Figure 5.3: Network used for the case study
The intrusion scenario is described in Table 5.5. The attacker began the attack from
compromised hosts in the Internet. The external servers (web server and file server) were
first explored with abuse of functionality. After few steps, the attacker obtained the vulner-
ability information and performed a buffer overflow attack on the file server and compro-
mised the external file server 192.168.1.3. Using this stepping stone, the attacker compro-
mised the internal server (Domain controller 192.168.3.1) and use it to probe the hosts in
Department C (192.168.30.x). The actual attack sequence was obfuscated with a few ob-
served actions altered. In particular, actions #5,#8,#13,#15, were observed as low-profile
explorations, i.e., abuse of functionality and network reconnaissance.
Given the attack models and the observed sequence, one can calculate the likelihood
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Table 5.5: Network attack sequence used in the case study
Obs.# Src. IP Desc. IP Clean Act. Noise Act.
1 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 A-1-1 A-1-1
2 237.21.22.14 192.168.1.2 A-1-2 A-1-2
3 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 A-2-1 A-2-1
4 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.2 A-2-2 A-2-2
5* 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 A-3-1 A-0-3*
6 237.21.22.14 192.168.1.3 A-3-1 A-3-1
7 9.5.231.72 192.168.1.3 A-3-2 A-3-2
8* 192.168.1.3 192.168.3.1 A-3-1 A-1-3*
9 192.168.1.3 192.168.3.1 A-3-1 A-3-1
10 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-2 A-3-2
11 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-1 A-3-1
12 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-2 A-3-2
13* 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-1 A-1-3*
14 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-2 A-3-2
15* 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-1 A-1-2*
16 192.168.3.1 192.168.30.1 A-3-2 A-3-2
for each model, i.e., how much the observed sequence fit for specific strategies. Figure
5.4 gives the likelihood comparison with respect to the four aforementioned attack models,
when the observed sequence is (1) consisted of the original attack actions without obfus-
cation (Clean), (2) altered with the obfuscated actions (Noise), and (3) recovered with the
inference algorithm discussed in Chapter 4 (InfAlg).
The original clean attack sequence shown in Table 5.5 includes a sequence of actions in
C-3 (high-profile vulnerability attempts). Comparing the four models, Model-4 describes
such behavior the best, and hence the likelihood to fit with Model-4 in Fig. 5.4(a) is the
highest. However, the obfuscated actions break the pattern in C-3 and the likelihood to
fit for the four models is completely different; Model-1 become the most likely model
as shown in Figure 5.4(b). This is because Model-1 describes a scenario of bouncing
between reconnaissance and vulnerability attempts to discover potential targets instead of
the focused attacks. In real-world application, such mis-classification could impact the
analyst’s decision making, e.g., having an inaccurate estimation of attacker’s capability
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(a) Clean (b) Noise (c) InfAlg
Figure 5.4: Likelihood comparison on obfuscated attacks
and objective.
The impact of obfuscation in this case is clearly profound, and needs an efficient way
to recover the likelihood of matching to Model-4 even in the presence of the obfuscated
actions. The proposed method does not recover the exact original sequence; instead, it
allows efficiently calculate P (Y|C) for each model C, so as to determine the best match.






possible combinations of the 4 altered positions. For each altered position combination,
there are 465, 920 possible noise sequences. The proposed algorithm efficiently recover, or
re-distribute the likelihood of matching to the four models as shown in Fig. 5.4(c). The
resulting likelihood distribution allows the analyst to conclude (recover) Model-4 as the
best match.
5.2.2 Action alteration impact evaluation
The algorithm proposed in our framework enables us to assess the impact for attack ob-
fuscations. This subsection expands on the example shown above to treat a large number
of obfuscated sequences with random obfuscation behaviors. We shall first describe more
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specifically how the use of the algorithm systematically determine the best match to one of
the four models.
For a given sequence, whether it is the original sequence X or the obfuscated sequence
Y, the optimal match one can do is to find maxC P (C|X) or maxC P (C|Y), which can be
found with P (X) and P (Y) based on Bayes rule, respectively. The algorithm discussed
calculates P (Y) efficiently, and P (X) can be directly derived based on the given attack
models. Note that maxC P (C|Y) represents the best likelihood one can match a given se-
quence Y to a model C, and the 1−maxC P (C|Y) also implies the least error for the given
sequence and the models. To assess the overall impact to any sequence, clean or obfuscated,
that can occur under the attack models, one will need to calculate
∑
X P (X) maxC P (C|X)
and
∑
Y P (Y) maxC P (C|Y), which are termed Optimal Classification Rate in this paper.
To efficiently assess the optimal classification rate over a large number of possible se-
quences under different scenarios, this paper uses Monte Carlo method to approximate the
summation. According to Hoeffding’s bound [84], at least 26, 492 samples are needed to
keep the approximation error within 1%; for each scenario, 30, 000 samples are used in the
simulation shown below.
Similar to the specific case study shown earlier, the simulation shown here also con-
siders the case where no inference or recovery is done for the obfuscated sequences - re-
ferred to as the “noise” case, in contrast to the “clean” case and the “InfAlg” case. The
optimal classification rate for the different cases are plotted when the first-order and the
second-order models are used to generate and classify attack sequences, respectively. The
first-order and second-order cases are separately considered to evaluate the effect of the
order of the model on the classification performance, and, thus, errors.
Figure 5.5 shows the impact of attack obfuscation for different sequence lengths ob-
served when the obfuscation level (M/N ) is fixed at 20%. The clean curves show the
optimal classification rate when the original attack sequences are classified to the models.
The noise curves give the performance on obfuscated sequences, but without assuming the
knowledge of these sequences were obfuscated. Finally, the InfAlg curves take advantage
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Figure 5.5: Classification performance vs. observation length
of the obfuscation model information and utilizes the inference algorithm proposed in this
paper to perform classification.
The performance for all curves increases as the observation length increases. This is
intuitive, the more observations exhibited from the same attack behavior, the easier one can
differentiate sequences among attack models. Second, the “InfAlg” curve is always above
the “noise” curve and below the “clean” curve for both the first-order and the second-order
cases; this shows quantitatively how much performance recovery one can optimally achieve
with the (limited) knowledge of the obfuscation behavior. In addition, the plot shows that
using the second order model gives better results than using the first order. This is also
expected because differentiating among more specific second-order models is easier than
doing so among first-order models. One should note that mixing first and second order
models, however, do not necessarily make it easier as evidenced by the case study shown
in the previous section; it depends on the characteristics of the models considered.
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This experiment result provides not only insights that verifies intuitions but also provide
quantitative assessment of the optimal performance one can achieve. For example, Fig. 5.5
shows that with the use of the inference algorithm and an observation length of 30, one can
recover from 82% classification rate to 85% for first-order models, and 90% to 95% for
second-order models. Comparing these numbers to the clean curves, one can assess how
much the best one can do with the given knowledge of obfuscation. With this framework,
one can test out the impact of obfuscation for different combinations of attack models and
obfuscation models.
A key property of the obfuscation model considered in Type-I model is the estimated
level of obfuscation M/N . Figure 5.5 shows the performance for different obfuscation
level when the sequence length is fixed at 40. For both first and second order-model cases,
the optimal classification rates for the original clean sequences are around 99% and 97%,
respectively; these numbers give the performance limit one can ever aim at for each sce-
nario. When the obfuscation level increases, the performance drops, especially for the
second-order model case without inference. At around the obfuscation level of 28%, the
obfuscated sequences without inference for the second-order case actually begin to exhibit
worse performance than that for the first-order case. Fortunately, with the limited knowl-
edge of obfuscation, the optimal classification rate can be recovered, e.g., from 60% to 90%
when the obfuscation level is at 40%. Interestingly, the performance recovered through in-
ference for the second-order model case remains better than that for the first-order case, at
least up to the 45% obfuscation level, which is very high. Generally speaking, the higher
the obfuscation level, the more improvements one can achieve, for both first and second-
order cases. The performance recovered through inference is closer to the absolute limit
exhibited by the clean curves for the second-order model case that that for the first-order
model case, at least when the obfuscation level is not too high.
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Figure 5.6: Classification performance vs. noise level
5.2.3 Evaluation the impact inaccurate obfuscation model
As discussed in subsection 5.2.2, one important parameter in obfuscation model for action
alteration is the obfuscation level, i.e., how much action alteration exists in the sequence.
In order to run the noise inference algorithm, this parameter M is assumed to be known.
In real application cases, one may argue that it is not reasonable for security analysts to
know how attacker perform obfuscation in such a detailed level, e.g., number of actions
changed. Therefore, in this subsection, we want to investigate how the parameterM impact
the proposed algorithm, and how much impact the inaccurate estimation of M can cause
empirically. We will show that, only an approximation of noise level is needed to get
a reasonably good inference results, which means even the analysts only have a rough
estimation of how much obfuscation exists, the proposed algorithm will still be very useful
for helping classify attack sequences.
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Figure 5.7: Inaccurate M estimation with respect to different sequence length
Using the same experiment design shown in Section 5.1, the obfuscated attack se-
quences were created using the true obfuscation level value Mtrue. On the other hand,
we intentionally set the inaccurate estimation of obfuscation level used for the inference.
The algorithm is executed based on different Mest values.
Figure 5.7 and Figure 5.8 shows the results of inaccurate obfuscation level impact esti-
mation. Figure 5.7 shows the inaccurate M respect to observation length. Clean sequence
length N from 10 to 60, and the real obfuscation level Mtrue is 40%. We estimated inac-
curate Mest from 20% and 60%. From the figure we can observe, correct M=40% have
the best performance, the curve is on the top of other curves. At the same time, the more
Mest close to real value Mtrue, the better performance it is, i.e., |Mtrue −Mest| = 10% are
better than |Mtrue −Mest| = 20%. The most important information is that the inaccurate
M would not affect the performance too much. Note that, in this experiment even the ob-
























































Figure 5.8: Inaccurate M estimation with respect to different noise level
can observe the big improvement comparing to the noise line. Finally, these trends remain
the same for different observation length.
Figure 5.8 evaluates the inaccurate M estimation respect to noise level. Mtrue changes
from 30% to 55%, and on different noise level, the Mest deviate Mtrue from 10% and
20%. From the figure we can observe the similar trends comparing to Fig. 5.7. The more
obfuscation exists, the worse the performance is, as shown in the decreasing noise curve.
At the same time, the noise inference curves are not decreasing too much comparing to the
noise curve. Further, the impact of the inaccurate M is still relative small: all of the noise
inference curves are close to each other, although Mest = Mtrue is the best. Finally, these
trends remain the same for different noise levels from 30% to 55%.
Figure 5.9 and Fig. 5.10 gives when noise level M approaches extreme cases, i.e.,
M = 0.0 and M = 1.0. Note that, for M = 0.0 the inference algorithm will not be able to
work, because according to the noise model definition, P (Y|X) = 0 (detailed discussion
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Figure 5.9: Inaccurate M estimation with respect to different noise level
can be found in Chapter 3.2.1). From the simulation results, one can conclude that with
less obfuscated events, the expected performance increases for the noise curve. And the
InfAlg curve improvement decreases. On the other hand, at the small noise level, inaccurate
estimation of M , will be worse than directly use the noise sequence for classification.
For M approach 1.0 case, the simulation results are shown in Fig. 5.10. Similar to pre-
vious observations, the nosieINF can always make a bit performance improvement and the
inaccurate M estimation does not affect the performance too much. Further, one interest-
ing observation is that the curves are not monotonically decrease, i.e., the performance for
changing all of the actions is even better than changing 95% of the actions. This counter-
intuitive observations can be explained with the combinatorial number of possible noise




(|Ω| − 1)M . Therefore number of possible sequences will reduce when M = 1.0, i.e.,
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Figure 5.10: Inaccurate M estimation with respect to different noise level
number of changes equal to sequence length case 2. Similar trend can also be observed in
the time cost evaluation figure (Fig. 4.8).
5.3 Type-II model simulation and results
5.3.1 Action insertion simulation
For Type-II model action insertion case, two specific scenarios are designed for simula-
tions. Based security domain knowledge, we believe they are representative to real action
insertion in attack.
Case one describes an attacker injecting independent noise observations on the attack
sequences, which means, the injected action have nothing to do with previous attack action
2Here we want to clarify the notation of M . In the action alteration obfuscation model, M is defined as a
positive integer and represent number of changes in the sequence. For better presentation, we changed noise





, M represent number of changes.
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and the ”clean attack actions”. This means the injected action has its own distribution con-
ditionally independent to other random variables. For example, the injected noisy actions
can have 80% of abuse of service action, and 20% of network reconnaissance action.
On the other hand, case two describes a more complicated action injection plan, the
injected action actually have some relationship with the clean actions. For example, in
the network reconnaissance stage and vulnerability attempt stage, the attacker would have
different preference to inject more actions in some categories than other categories. Such
noise injection plan can be effective to confuse the alert analysis engine on the intrusion
stage assessment and eventually cover the intrusion stage and hide the real intent.
According to the attack scenario description and dependencies between random vari-
ables, two action injection scenarios can be described graphically in Fig. 5.11 and Fig.
5.11. Comparing to the general noise insertion model described in Fig. 3.6, conditional de-
pendencies (links in the graph) need to be removed to reflect aforementioned scenarios. As
discussed in Chapter 3, section 3.2.2, link removing can be easily done by setting special
values in the model parameters.
X1 X2 · · · XN/2
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 · · · · · · YN−1 YN
Figure 5.11: Graphical representation of action insertion case 1
The simulation results are different than want we expected but very reasonable to ex-
plain. Original we thought action insertion scenario one is much simpler comparing to
scenario two (injection pure random noise vs. well planned action injection obfuscation)
and should be easily treated. The inference result for scenario one should have better per-
formance than two. However, the results are opposite: using the same simulation set up
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X1 X2 · · · XN/2
Y1 Y2 Y3 Y4 · · · · · · YN−1 YN
Figure 5.12: Graphical representation of action insertion case 2
(action space, network configuration, attack models), the inference performance for sce-
nario two is much better than scenario one as shown in Fig. 5.13. The InfAlg curve for
insertion scenario one overlaps with the noise curve and shows almost nothing improved.
This means that by only injecting the independent noisy observations, if the alert analysis
system did not filter unrelated action ahead and feed the noise sequence into the pattern
match engine, such case would have a big impact on the sequence classification.
Such results can be explained intuitively with the evaluation framework. In the experi-
ment set up, we assume we know the full knowledge of attack model and noise model3, i.e.,
the joint distribution of clean sequence X and obfuscated sequence Y and our contribution
is derive efficient algorithm to compute specific probabilities. Because we know the joint
distribution, the more information we know about the obfuscation model, the better perfor-
mance we can have for the proposed inference algorithm. On the other hand, in the action
insertion scenario one is more uncertain (the probability distribution has a high entropy)
because of the independent distribution on inserted actions, the inference algorithm will
help little. As a result, we can conclude that, the more we know and the more accurate we
know about the relationship between action with the clean action, the better performance
we can achieve. In addition, it is very important to exclude or filter out the unrelated noisy
attack actions before feeding the sequence into the pattern match engine.
3As shown in section 5.2.3, inaccurate estimation of model can also be acceptable.
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Figure 5.13: Simulation results for two different noise insertion (NI) models
5.3.2 Action removal simulation
For action removal simulation, we also evaluated two different cases. Case one can be
described in Fig. 5.14. The model does not have connections in Y and one of two clean
actions can be removed by attacker. The security context behind this model is that the
attacker would perform attempts on different services and vulnerabilities, and sometimes
using high profile attack actions such buffer overflow attempt, and sometimes using low
profile attack actions such as abuse of functionality. And the attacker is keep doing such
attacks on different services. Therefore, suppose the observations will depend on sensor
configuration, for some services, high profile actions can be observed, and for some other
services low profile actions can be observed. We spent some time to select the attack actions
and set parameters to be more realistic to reflect the actions can be observed.
Another type of action removal is shown in Fig. 5.15. it does not have the connection
from X2i, i ∈ {1, 2, 3, · · · } (subscript is even number) to Y. And this model represents a
106
X1 X2 X3 X4 · · · · · · XN−1 XN
Y1 Y2 · · · YN/2
Figure 5.14: Graphical representation for action removal case 1
more stealthy and decoy attack. There are covering up actions with the real actions. We
assume the covering up actions should have relationship (conditional dependencies) with
the real actions which is different from the case of attack generate ”random actions”, but
generate ”related actions” to mislead security analyst. On the other hand, because the goal
of such action is misleading, the Y is also related to previous actions which are the links
within Y.
X1 X2 X3 X4 · · · · · · XN−1 XN
Y1 Y2 · · · YN/2
Figure 5.15: Graphical representation for action removal case 2
The simulations set up are as same as previous cases (action space, network, attack
models), and the results are shown in Fig. 5.16.
From the results we can conclude that it is easier for network analyst to deal with the
case one than case two. The noise curve and InfAlg curve for case one are much higher than
case two. This observation is intuitive because our according to our design the case two
is more advanced obfuscation in terms of the attacker intentionally mis-leads the analyst.
Further, the noise curve is around 0.5, which is the lower bound of classify two models.
This tells us that if the attacker can really do the decoy obfuscation described before, that is
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Figure 5.16: Simulation results for two different action removal (AR) models
actually very misleading and we can do nothing, if we only have noise sequence. However,
the noise inference for the case two line has some gaps between the noise line and noise
inference line. It tells us that if we know the attack model and noise model to some level,
the noise inference algorithm would still be very useful. Finally, the we notice the InfAlg
curve for case two and noise curve for case one are very similar. This tells the best results
for case have is approximately equal to the worse case for case one. This is because for
both cases, we are trying to inference from one of the two actions. And our inference in
case one can be viewed as removing the decoy/misleading factors (edges between Y) but
case two would have both stealthy and decoy factors.
Finally, we compare the impact for different types of obfuscations: noise insertion (NI),
action alteration (AA) and action removal (AR). The aggregated view of performance limit
for different scenarios are shown in 5.17. Two first order attack models listed in 5.1 and
5.1 are selected to run the simulation. For Type-I model, noise level was set to 20%. For
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Figure 5.17: Comparison for different attack obfuscation techniques
Type-II model, obfuscation technique listed in Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.14 were used. From
the simulation results we can conclude that, comparing to action alteration, action insertion
and removal could cause more impact on the system, as shown in the figure the noise curve
for action and removal are in the bottom. On the other hand, the improvement of the noise
insertion case can be big if we know some information about the relationship between the




The mixture of organized cyber crimes and random attacks against enterprise and gov-
ernment networks has led to asymmetric cyber battlefields filled with large-scale cyber
attacks. To obtain a timely situation awareness from overwhelming, diverse and evolving
data, analysts can benefit from effective computational techniques performing intrusion de-
tection, alert correlation, attack characterization and prediction, host clustering. Drawing
the analogy from social network analysis, we define an attack social graph to represent the
relationship between attack sources. Applying the notion of degree centrality and agglom-
erative hierarchical clustering, various types of collaborative attack, or spatial patterns are
discovered. These spatial patterns enable a labeling scheme for attack sources over time, re-
sulting in an integrated spatial and temporal model for collaborative attack sources. Markov
models are developed to differentiate and infer cyber attack strategies worthy of further in-
vestigation. The experiment results using Network Telescope and ICTF data show that the
integrated spatial and temporal analyses can provide additional insights for high impact
attacks that are not trivial by applying traditional statistical or anomaly analyses.
Further, moving beyond intrusion detection, network security can benefit from projec-
tion of multistage attacks, where likely future targets can be identified for timely responses.
Projecting cyber attacks requires extraction and analysis of various characteristics, includ-
ing the history of patterns exhibited in attacks’ progression in the network. While previous
work introduced attack assessments based on these characteristics, we revisited them and
presented fuzzy VLMM framework to combine the attack projection estimates. Thorough
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analysis via simulation were presented to provide insights toward ensemble characteriza-
tion of multistage attacks. The analysis reveals that fuzzy VLMM frame work can effec-
tively capture sequential patterns of attack progression and the combined estimates can be
very useful for action prediction. More importantly we demonstrated the impact can be
large for different types of noises exist in the attack sequence.
Finally, we reviewed attack obfuscation and countermeasures and propose and solve
the inference problem for obfuscated attack sequences, which enables the study of the ben-
efits and limitations of attack sequence modeling and classification. Recovering the most
likely original attack sequence and revealing the optimal classification rates under different
attack models allow assessing the value of developing and using attack models that can be
used to correlate observed events. In real applications, long observation window of attack
sequences, large number of noisy observations, large number of possible attack actions or
high order of generative Markov models can all lead to overwhelming computation time.
The inference algorithm developed in this paper provides a mean to determine the optimal
classification rates under different scenarios efficiently.
The framework and methods developed in our work can also be applied to other con-
texts beyond network security. Any behavior sequences that might suffer from noise and
require matching to pre-defined models can use this work to recover the most likely clean
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• Alert: ICMP PING NMAP.
– Summary: This event is generated when an ICMP ping typically generated by
nmap is detected.
– Impact: This could indicate a full scan by nmap which is sometimes indicative
of potentially malicious behavior.
– Detailed information: Nmap’s ICMP ping, by default, sends zero data as part of
the ping. Nmap typically pings the host via icmp if the user has root privileges,
and uses a tcp-ping otherwise.
• Alert: WEB-MISC cat%20 access
– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to exploit a known
vulnerability on a web server or a web application resident on a web server.
– Impact: Information gathering and system integrity compromise. Possible unau-
thorized administrative access to the server. Possible execution of arbitrary code
of the attackers choosing in some cases.
– Detailed information: This event is generated when an attempt is made to com-
promise a host running a Web server or a vulnerable application on a web server.
Many known vulnerabilities exist for each implementation and the attack sce-
narios are legion. Some applications do not perform stringent checks when
validating the credentials of a client host connecting to the services offered
on a host server. This can lead to unauthorized access and possibly escalated
privileges to that of the administrator. Data stored on the machine can be com-
promised and trust relationships between the victim server and other hosts can
be exploited by the attacker.
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• Alert: WEB-MISC http directory traversal
– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to execute a direc-
tory traversal attack.
– Impact: Information disclosure. This is a directory traversal attempt which
can lead to information disclosure and possible exposure of sensitive system
information.
– Detailed information: Directory traversal attacks usually target web, web ap-
plications and ftp servers that do not correctly check the path to a file when
requested by the client. This can lead to the disclosure of sensitive system in-
formation which may be used by an attacker to further compromise the system.
• Alert: WEB-MISC /etc/passwd
– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to retrieve a pro-
tected system file on a host via a web request.
– Impact: Information Gathering.
– Detailed information: The passwd file usually found in the /etc/ directory on
UNIX based systems, contains login information for users of a host. If shadow
password files are not being used, an attacker could obtain valid login informa-
tion for the system by using widely available password cracking tools on the
file. The file may also be used to garner information that may be used in brute
force password guessing attacks against the host.
• Alert: SHELLCODE x86 NOOP
– Summary: A series of NOP instructions for Intel’s x86 architecure was de-
tected.
– Impact: As part of an attack on a remote service, an attacker may attempt to take
advantage of insecure coding practices in hopes of executing arbitrary code.
This procedure generally makes use of NOPs.
– Detailed information: The NOP allows an attacker to fill an address space with
a large number of NOPs followed by his or her code of choice. This allows
”sledding” into the attackers shellcode.
• Alert: WEB-MISC robots.txt access
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– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to access the file
robots.txt directly.
– Impact: Information gathering.
– Detailed information: Robots.txt access is usually made by search robots for
site indexing. A webmaster sometimes adds information for areas of the site
that should not be indexed by the engine. This can include user directories
and files and directories used in administration of the server. The information
gathered from robots.txt could be used for system compromise and control of
the web server.
• Alert: WEB-ATTACKS /bin/ls command attempt
– Summary: Attempted ps command access via web
– Impact: Attempt to gain information on system files and filestructure
– Detailed information: This is an attempt to gain intelligence on the filesystem
on a webserver. The ls command lists the files and filesystem layout on a UNIX
or Linux based system. The attacker could possibly gain information needed
for other attacks on the host.
• Alert: WEB-MISC ls%20-l
– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to exploit a known
vulnerability on a web server or a web application resident on a web server.
– Impact: Information gathering and system integrity compromise. Possible unau-
thorized administrative access to the server. Possible execution of arbitrary code
of the attackers choosing in some cases.
– Detailed information: This event is generated when an attempt is made to com-
promise a host running a Web server or a vulnerable application on a web server.
Many known vulnerabilities exist for each implementation and the attack sce-
narios are legion. Some applications do not perform stringent checks when
validating the credentials of a client host connecting to the services offered
on a host server. This can lead to unauthorized access and possibly escalated
privileges to that of the administrator. Data stored on the machine can be com-
promised and trust relationships between the victim server and other hosts can
be exploited by the attacker.
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• Alert: INDICATOR-OBFUSCATION base64-encoded uri data object found
– Summary: This event is generated when network traffic that indicates a base64-
encoded uri data object found has been detected in network traffic.
– Impact: Unknown.
– Detailed information: This event indicates that network traffic indicating that
base64-encoded uri data object has been detected. Attackers may exploit sys-
tems by embedding certain filetypes within other files or by using encoding
schemes.
• Alert: WEB-IIS header field buffer overflow attempt
– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to overflow a buffer
in HTTP header field handler of Microsoft Internet Information Server (IIS)
versions 4.0, 5.0, and 5.1.
– Impact: Denial of Service, arbitrary code execution. Full administrative control
is possible.
– Detailed information: A vulnerability exists in HTTP header process in ASP.DLL
, a specially crafted packet sent to this processor will allow an attacker to dis-
rupt the ISS service or run any arbitrary commands with the privileges of the
ASP ISAPI extension.
• Alert: SCAN nmap fingerprint attempt
– Summary: This event is generated when the nmap port scanner and reconnais-
sance tool is used against a host. When run with the ’-O’ option, it attempts to
identify the remote operating system.
– Impact: Can provide useful reconnaissance information to an attacker. Has
been known to cause a denial of service on some older hosts.
– Detailed Information: Nmap attempts to identify the remote operating system
by looking for different services that are common or specific to particular oper-
ating systems. It also sends a variety of abnormal packets that are often handled
differently by different operating systems so that it can differentiate between
them based on the responses.
• Alert: SCAN nmap TCP
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– Summary: This event is generated when the nmap port scanner and reconnais-
sance tool is used against a host.
– Impact: This could be part of a full scan by nmap and could indicate potential
malicious reconnaissance of the targeted network or host.
– Detailed Information: Some versions of Nmap’s TCP ping, if selected, sends
a TCP ACK with an ACK number = 0. Nmap can use TCP ping as a second
alternative to ICMP Ping.
• Alert: SCAN nmap XMAS
– Summary: A nmap XMAS scan was detected.
– Impact: System reconnaissance that may include open/closed/firewalled ports,ACLs.
– Detailed Information: Nmap sets the URG PSH and FIN bits as part of it’s
XMAS scan. Typically, a closed port will respond with an ACK RST, whereas
an open port may not respond at all. However, this varies from machine to ma-
chine, and also depends on what (if any) filtering policies are in place between
the hosts in question.
• Alert: FTP command overflow attempt
– Summary: This event is generated when an attempt is made to send an overly
long FTP command, possibly with the intent to cause of denial of service or
buffer overflow in the 3CDaemon FTP server.
– Impact: Attempted remote access or denial of service. Successful execution
of this attack can cause a denial of service or buffer overflow, allowing the
execution of arbitrary commands on the vulnerable FTP server.
– Detailed Information: 3CDaemon is an FTP server for Windows hosts. A buffer
overflow vulnerability exists in 3CDaemon revision 10. The exploit is caused
by sending an FTP command that is 400 bytes or longer, causing the server to
crash or permitting a buffer overflow that may allow the execution of arbitrary
commands with the privileges of the process running the FTP server. This attack
does not require login access to the FTP server.
• Alert: INDICATOR-COMPROMISE c99shell.php command request - ls
– Summary: This event is generated when activity relating to the ”c99shell.php”
Trojan Horse program is detected.
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– Impact: Possible theft of data and control of the targeted machine leading to a
compromise of all resources the machine is connected to.
– Detailed Information: Trojan horse programs can be used by an attacker to
steal data from the infected machine, they can also be used to control the in-
fected host. This event indicates that activity relating to the trojan horse pro-
gram c99shell.php has been detected in network traffic. In particular this event
indicates that the software detected is a Remote Access Trojan. RAT programs
allow full control of the target system using a client on the attackers machine
that connects to the server on the client host.
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Appendix B
Recursion rule theorem proof
According to definition expand
∑
B Fi−1,j(< B,A
′ >), we have
∑
B






P (X1, X2, · · · , XL)
i−1−L∏
k=1





 f(< B,A >)
(B.1)
s.t. < Xi−L, Xi−L+1, · · · , Xi−1 >=< B,A1, · · · , AL−1 > (B.2)
| < X1, X2, · · · , Xi−1 > − < Y1, Y2, · · · , Yi−1 > |H = j
According to constraint (B.2), we know B = Xi−L and < A1, · · · , AL−1 >=< Xi−L+1, · · · ,
Xi−1 >. Substitute these two terms in (B.1) we have
∑
X1···Xi−1
P (X1, X2, · · · , XL)
i−1−L∏
k=1




g(Xk, Yk) · f(Xi−L, Xi−L+1, · · · , , Xi−1, AL)
s.t. < Xi−L+1, · · · , Xi−1 >=< A1, · · · , AL−1 >
| < X1, X2, · · · , Xi−1 > − < Y1, Y2, · · · , Yi−1 > |H = j (B.4)
We can combine term f(Xi−L, · · · , , Xi−1, AL) to product
∏i−1−L
k=1 f(Xk, · · · , Xk+L) we have
(B.5). At same time, adding the constraint Xi = Yi, AL = Yi we can also expand the Hamming




g(Xk, Yk) can also be expanded




P (X1, X2, · · · , XL)
i−L∏
k=1





s.t. < Xi−L+1, · · · , Xi−1 >=< A1, · · · , AL−1 > (B.6)
Xi = AL (B.7)
| < X1, X2, · · · , Xi−1, Yi > − < Y1, Y2, · · · , Yi−1, Yi > |H = j (B.8)
AL = Yi
Combine the constraint (B.6) and (B.7), we have
< Xi−L+1, · · ·Xi >= A (B.9)
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